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In some ways, Pakistan’s economic growth since 1947 has been 
remarkable. The country’s economic viability was considered, in some quarters,
1 
in serious doubt at its emergence, but it has managed, despite a quadrupling of 
the population, to bring about significant improvement in the average living 
standards. Per capita GNP growth, on average around 2 percent per annum over a 
long stretch of nearly fifty years, has been the best among countries of the 
subcontinent. This growth has meant an increase in average income of about 150 
percent over 1950–96.  But Pakistan, like many other developing countries, has 
not been able to narrow the gap between itself and rich industrial nations which 
have grown faster on a per head basis.  Also, Pakistan has lost substantial 
economic ground to the rapidly growing economies of East Asia notably China, 
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. In 1960, South Korea’s per 
capita income was only marginally ahead of Pakistan’s. In the short period of 
one generation, Korea had an income level which on purchasing power parity 
basis five times that of Pakistan in 1995.  On the same basis, Thailand and 
Malaysia enjoyed a per capita income advantage of 200 to 300 percent over 
Pakistan (Table 2). 
Pakistan’s lagging behind the more successful developing countries is, however, 
only one aspect of its disappointing economic performance. More seriously, the pattern 
of Pakistan’s growth has been deeply flawed because it has not ensured either 
sustainability or a reasonably equitable distribution of growth benefits.  While Pakistan 
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has enjoyed fairly good per capita GNP growth, it has been much less successful in 
reducing poverty, increasing the level of human resource development, modernising the 
industrial sector, and increasing the level of domestic savings.  The persistence of a high 
degree of dependence on external resources, poor level of development of human 
capital, inadequate long-term investment in infrastructure and serious structural 
weaknesses in industry and exports have already slowed down growth.  Per capita GNP 
growth rate during 1985–95 was only 1.2 percent per annum, substantially lower than 
India (3.2), Bangladesh (2.1), and Sri Lanka (2.6).  Thus Pakistan as it approached its 
fiftieth anniversary was faced not only with the worst financial crisis in its history but 
also a serious, though less clearly perceived, ‘growth crisis’. There is a growth crisis in 
the sense that without major structural changes and further policy reform, significant 
positive growth in per capita incomes can no longer be taken for granted. 
  The objectives of this paper are to trace the source of present economic 
difficulties and to draw lessons from our past experience. 
 
GDP Growth 
GDP growth is the most widely used measure of economic performance.  By this 
measure, Pakistan’s economy grew at an average rate of over 5 percent over 1949–96, a 
period of nearly fifty years. Growth was slow during the 1950s averaging 3.1 percent per 
annum but accelerated to 6.7 percent during the sixties and remained generally close to 6 
percent per annum till the early 1990s.  As Table 1 indicates, over the three decades, 
1960–90, only a handful of East Asian countries enjoyed average GDP growth rates 
exceeding that of Pakistan’s rate of close to 6 percent per annum. Till around 1990, 
Pakistan’s GDP growth rate was distinctly higher than that of other countries on the 
subcontinent.  Pakistan’s population growth at 3 percent per annum for long periods of 
its history has however exceeded that of most developing countries with the exception of 
Mexico.  
On a GNP per capita growth basis, therefore, Pakistan’s record appears less 
impressive; Egypt and Indonesia—countries already having a living standard higher than 
Pakistan—have grown faster since 1960.  The slow down in per capita GNP growth 
since the mid-1980s has further eroded Pakistan’s relative position in the international 
economy.  As the following table indicates, on a purchasing power parity basis, Pakistan 
is now substantially poorer than other large developing countries with the exception of 
India and Bangladesh.  But both these countries have gained ground relative to Pakistan 
since 1987. 
As Table 3 shows, there were rather wide variations in the growth rate of the 
economy during the various political periods. Growth was relatively slow not only in the 
1950s but also during Zulfiqar Bhutto’s years and in the recent period of return to 






Average Annual Growth Rates of GDP and per Capita GNP 
(In Percent per Annum) 
  GDP  GNP per Capita 
Countries   1960–1970 1970–1980 1980–1990 1990–1995 1970–1985 1985–1995 
South Asia        
Bangladesh  4.0 3.4 4.3 4.1 0.0 2.1 
India  3.7 3.0 5.8 4.6 1.5 3.2 
Pakistan  6.7 4.7 6.3 4.6 2.7 1.2 
Sri  Lanka  4.6 4.6 4.2 4.8 3.4 2.6 
East Asia        
China  5.2 6.0  10.2  12.8  5.6 8.3 
Indonesia  3.9 7.6 6.1 7.6 4.2 6.0 
Korea  8.6 7.2 9.4 7.2  10.1  7.7 
Malaysia  6.5 7.9 5.2 8.7 4.1 5.7 
Philippines  5.1 5.8 1.0 2.3 0.8 1.5 
Thailand  8.4 7.1 7.6 8.4 3.6 8.4 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
       
Egypt  4.3 8.0 5.0 1.3 4.6 1.1 
Morocco  4.4 5.6 4.2 1.7 2.1 0.9 
Turkey 6.0 4.0 5.3 3.2  Negative  2.2 
Latin America         
Argentina  4.3  2.9 –0.3 5.7 –0.7 1.8 
Brazil  5.4 8.5 2.7 2.7 3.3 -0.8 
Chile  4.4 2.9 4.1 7.3 -0.5 6.1 
Mexico 7.6 6.6 1.0 1.1 2.0 0.1 
Source:  World Bank; World Development Reports. GNP per capita estimates are based on World Bank 
methodology which takes into account exchange rate movements and thus are not necessarily 
consistent with estimates derived from national data of GDP and population growth. Parvez Hasan  358 
Table 2 
Purchasing Power Estimates of GNP Per Capita 
  Current  International $  US=100 
Countries 1995  1987  1995 
Bangladesh 1,380  4.8  5.1 
Brazil 5,400  24.2  20.0 
China 2,920  6.3  10.8 
Egypt 3,820  14.3  14.2 
India 1,400  4.4  5.2 
Indonesia 3,800  9.8  14.0 
Malaysia 9,020  22.9  33.4 
Korea 11,450  27.3  42.4 
Pakistan 2,230  8.4  8.3 
Thailand 7,540  16.2  28.0 
Turkey   5,580  20.4  20.7 
Mexico 6,400  27.8  23.7 
Sri Lanka  3,250  10.6  12.1 
Source: World Bank , World Development Report 1997. 
 
Table 3 
Annual Growth Rates of GNP; Population and per Capita GNP  
Percent per Annum 
Years  GNP  Population  Per Capita GNP  
1950–1960 3.1 2.4 0.6 
1960–1970 6.7 2.9 3.8 
1970–1977 4.4 3.2 1.3 
1977–1988 6.4 3.1 3.3 
1988–1996 4.3 3.0 1.2 
Source: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, various issues. 
 
exceptional growth. There is no doubt that relatively greater political stability under 
military rule and strong technocratic management contributed to high growth. However, 
too much should not be read into these differences in the growth rates by period as they 
cannot be used uncritically as performance yardsticks.  The exceptional growth during 
the Ayub years was in no small part due to the sharp stepping up of the rate of 
investment, especially public investment in the 1950s.  The slow down of growth during 





weather conditions and technical problems which delayed the availability of Tarbela 
Dam waters. Growth during the Zia period benefited not only from the completion of 
sizable investments in water, fertiliser, cement and steel undertaken earlier but also from 
the substantially positive impact of large scale remittances, external assistance for 
Afghani mujahedin and growth in the narcotics trade. Growth in the period since 1988 
has suffered in part because long term investment was neglected under Zia because the 
large over hang of domestic public debt made the reduction of the fiscal deficit difficult 
and because the stimulus provided to the economy by large worker remittances 
continued to wane. 
 
Inflation 
As GDP growth slowed down, inflation accelerated in the 1990s. Between mid-
1990 and mid-1996 prices as measured by the GDP deflator nearly doubled, indicating 
an average annual increase of over 11 percent.  Since mid-1993, prices have increased 
over 12 percent per annum.  The 1990s have been the worst period of inflation in 
Pakistan’s history with the exception of 1972–77 when prices grew by 15 percent per 
annum reflecting both domestic monetary expansion and international price pressures.  
However, notwithstanding the recent surge, inflation in Pakistan has been moderate by 
developing country standards.  Pakistan’s average annual inflation rate of 7.8 percent 
during 1960–95 was marginally lower than other countries in South Asia. Among 
comparable countries, only China, Thailand and Malaysia have had a better inflation 
record.  It may appear odd that inflation in Pakistan remained moderate for long periods 
even though fiscal deficits remained sizable for well over two decades. The explanation 
lies in the fact that large and persistent fiscal deficits could be financed for a considerable 
time from non-inflationary sources, notably large foreign assistance and very large 
borrowing from non-bank sources.  Reliance on money creation for financing fiscal 
deficits was relatively limited except during 1972–77 and 1990–96 when credit to the 
public sector virtually exploded.  It is hardly surprising that these were also the periods 
of high inflation.  Still overall increase in price levels over 1950–95 was at least twenty 
folds compared to a rise in price level of six to seven folds in industrial countries.  This 
had consequences for the foreign exchange value of the rupee, income distribution 
especially the real salaries of public servants, and the pattern of investment, encouraging 
as it did the more speculative and less productive investments in land and housing. 
 
Reliance on External Assistance 
  A fundamental reason why Pakistan was able to avoid both financial crises and 
high inflation till the 1990s, notwithstanding large and persistent fiscal deficits, has been 
its extraordinary dependence on external resources for financing investment outlays and  
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the availability of large flows of external assistance on concessional terms for long 
periods of time.  Large foreign assistance also explains to a great extent why growth 
remained relatively high despite low domestic savings. The heavy dependence on 




Investment and Savings Rates Selected Years 
(As % of GDP) 
Year Investment  Foreign  Savings 
National 
Savings 
1949-1950 4.0  2.0  2.0 
1959-1960 12.5  6.0 6.5 
1964-1965 22.1  10.5  10.6 
1969-1970 14.6  4.5  10.1 
1976-1977 19.3  7.0  12.3 
1987-1988 18.0  4.4  13.6 
1995-1996 18.2  7.0  11.2 
Note: The figures for the years up to 1969-70 refer to West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and exclude East Pakistan.  
There are no official figures of savings and investments for West Pakistan prior to 1969-70.  The author 
has based his estimates for these years partially on official data from various issues of Economic Survey 
and partially on other sources, notably Mahbub ul Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning (Lahore: 
Oxford University Press, 1963); Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan’s Development and Report of the Panel of 
Economists in the Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970–75) (Government 
of Pakistan, Planning Commission, 1970.) Foreign savings are defined as current account balance-of-
payments deficits before official transfers. 
 
Pakistan has continued to rely more heavily on external resources than most other 
large developing countries notwithstanding large worker remittances.  Pakistan’s current 
account balance of payments deficit averaging over 5 percent of GDP during 1974–93 
was larger than those in comparable developing countries except Bangladesh, Sri Lanka 
and Egypt.  
Normally deficit levels of 4-5 percent of GDP are not sustainable unless export 
earnings are rising rapidly, thereby increasing the ability to service debt sharply. 
Thailand and Malaysia enjoyed very high rates of export expansion during the 1970s 
and the 1980s and therefore were able to avoid an increase in the relative burden of 
external debt.
2 Other countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, which borrowed 
heavily in the 1970s and ran current account deficits of 4-5 percent of GDP for a decade 
2The recent foreign exchange crises in Thailand and Malaysia were partly attributable to the fact 
that these countries allowed the current account balance-of-payments deficits to increase to around 6 





without a strong expansion of exports, ran into serious external debt difficulties which 
sharply curtailed borrowing and net inflows in the 1980s. Egypt also experienced serious 
debt difficulties in the late 1980s and required debt relief even though a large part of its 
huge balance of payments assistance had been financed through grant assistance. 
In Pakistan’s case, as in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, it was the relatively 
concessional terms of borrowing, i.e. low interest rates and long maturities of debt, 
which enabled it to avoid debt-servicing problems for such a long time.  The availability 
of concessional assistance made it possible for Pakistan to run current account deficits 
on a sustained basis at a higher level than even the rapidly growing economies of East 
Asia. The scale and terms of assistance have enabled Pakistan to enjoy relative financial 
stability without having to face strict financial discipline for extended periods especially 
in fiscal matters. 
But the composition of external flows to Pakistan has been changing, slowly but 
perceptibly, with a reduction in the availability of concessional assistance and relatively 
more reliance on market term borrowings and private investment flows.  While the total 
external debt trebled from $10 billion in 1980 to $30 billion in 1995, the ratio of external 
debt to GDP had increased from 42 percent to 50 percent and the ratio of debt to exports 
of goods and services had increased from 209 percent to 258 percent. Reflecting the 
hardening of terms, the annual debt service ratio (principal and interest payments as a 
percentage of foreign exchange earnings) rose even more sharply from 18 to 27 percent 
over the period.  More importantly, in the five years 1992–96, nearly one-third of the 
foreign exchange gap was met from growth in resident and non-resident foreign 
currency accounts which are short-term liabilities and have proven somewhat volatile.  
The profile of external liabilities had worsened seriously over time and was the chief 
cause of foreign exchange difficulties after mid-1996. 
 
Domestic Savings 
The persistence of a high level of dependence on external resources has been 
mainly the result of poor domestic savings performance though as discussed below the 
relative ease of external financing has also contributed to the low level of savings.
3 
Consistently low rates of domestic savings have precluded not only a reduction in the 
reliance on foreign savings but also have constrained the growth in investment. The 
national savings rate rose significantly from the extremely low level of 2.5 percent of  
3The terms ‘national’ and ‘domestic’ savings are used here as synonymous.  Actually gross 
national savings = gross domestic savings + net factor income from abroad.  Worker remittances raise 
domestic savings while interest payments on foreign debt reduce domestic savings. Because of the 
preponderance of worker remittances, the two series diverged in the 1980s, with national savings being 
considerably higher than domestic savings.  By the mid-1990s, with the rise in interest payments on 
external debt and other investment income payments abroad, the national savings were only marginally 
higher than domestic savings. Parvez Hasan  362 
 
GDP in 1949-50 to 10.5 percent in 1964-5. It improved further in the 1980s, rising to a 
peak of 16 percent of GDP in 1986-7, as large worker remittances came in. However, by 
mid-1995-96, the national savings rate had fallen back to 12 percent. Over the long 
stretch of the last three decades, the marginal saving rate has been below 15 percent.
4 
This compares with marginal savings rates in India of over 25 percent and 35 to 40 
percent in the many successful East Asian countries like Korea, China and Indonesia 
during 1973–93.  By  mid-1990s, East Asian countries were saving 30 to 40 percent of 
their gross domestic product  while Pakistan’s savings rate was only half the Indian rate 
of 24 percent. 
Pakistan’s inability to raise domestic saving levels over long periods is related to 
a complex inter-play of forces which have operated ever since partition. There have been 
political, policy and institutional failures on the broad front of domestic mobilisation of 
resources. There are at least six factors which have adversely affected domestic savings 
performance: political conditions and social attitudes, high rate of population growth and 
resulting high number of dependents as percentage of working age population, relative 
ease of external resource options, failure of fiscal policies to generate public savings 
given the pressures of large defence spending, absence of a clear framework for private 
sector development and poor development of the financial sector. 
Before discussing the above elements, it is necessary to touch on the view that 
insufficient domestic savings reflect merely capital flight and that well-to-do Pakistanis 
keep the bulk of their savings abroad. This is a highly simplistic and grossly exaggerated 
view.  The ten-percentage point annual difference in terms of GDP between the 
domestic savings rate of India and Pakistan simply cannot be explained by capital flight. 
 Even if one assumes that the transfer of savings abroad was significant on a sustained 
basis, the behaviour was influenced by policy variables such as negative real returns on 
bank deposits, inadequate development of capital markets, and in recent years 
favourable tax and other treatment provided to foreign currency deposits. Indeed to an 
extent, the large build up of foreign currency resident deposits since 1991, at an annual 
rate of 1-1.5 percent of GDP, suggests reverse capital flight.
5 
 
Political and Social Factors 
Political leadership in Pakistan has rarely emphasised the importance of sacrifice 
and savings for long-term development, and social attitudes have compounded the 
4The marginal saving rate, as distinct from the average saving rate, is calculated by relating the 
increment of savings to the increment of GDP or GNP. 
5Pakistan treats the additions to resident foreign currency deposits as private transfers  and thus as 
national savings (see Footnote 3 above).This is a questionable treatment because it tends to understate the 
current account balance of payments. The savings available through the accumulation of foreign currency 





problem. At a more fundamental level, the low rate of domestic savings denotes low 
confidence in the future.  Increased savings imply postponed consumption, and unless 
confidence in the future is strong, future consumption is heavily discounted Periods of 
political uncertainty also adversely affected domestic resource mobilisation efforts. 
Indeed, it is interesting that the highest rate of marginal savings of over 20 percent was 
recorded during 1960–65, one of the best periods in terms of political stability. The 
favouring of consumption over investment and the trend toward conspicuous 
consumption also had its historical roots in the early years.  The combination of the non-
devaluation of 1949, which overvalued the rupee, and the use of large windfall gains 
from the Korean war commodity boom mainly for consumer goods imports including 
luxury consumer goods such as expensive automobiles definitely created a bias toward 
consumption.  This bias favoured West Pakistan to the extent that it benefited from the 
surplus foreign exchange generated by East Pakistan. In the process, the growing 
divergence in the life styles of the well-to-do in the two wings sowed the seeds of 
political discontent among the Bengali intelligentsia.  Once the foreign exchange ran out, 
the incentives were changed.  Almost a total ban was imposed on cotton textiles and 
other luxury consumer goods imports in 1952 and the rupee was devalued in 1955. 
Industrial profits rose sharply and were plowed back in large part.  Indeed, considering 
the poor start, the savings performance during the 1950s was fair. But it would have 
much worse if the US military assistance which started in 1955 had not eased very 
substantially the burden of defence spending on the government budget. 
 
High Population Growth 
Pakistan’s population has grown rapidly from around 30 million in 1947 to over 
130 million in 1996.  The rate of annual growth has averaged 3 percent since 1960. This 
high rate of growth has meant that the number of children per household was increasing 
and, therefore, the dependency ratio (the proportion of dependent children to working 
age population) remained high. In 1995 the dependency ratio was 0.9 in Pakistan 
compared to 0.7 in India, 0.5 in China and 0.6 in Indonesia. It has been noted
6 that high 
dependency ratios often are associated with lower household savings and Pakistan was 
no exception. 
 
Relative Ease of External Options 
External resources are an important and necessary supplement to domestic 
resources in the process of development. In Pakistan, however, the relatively easy 
availability of external resources has often led to a substitution of foreign savings for 
6Among others Professors A. K Sen and J. Sachs of Harvard University have argued that high 
population growth depresses savings. Susan Cochrane and others, Household Consequences of High 
Fertility in Pakistan (World Bank Discussion Paper 111) also found that the number of children 
negatively affected savings especially in the rural areas. Parvez Hasan  364 
domestic effort. Since large current account balance of payments deficits could often be 
financed without too much difficulty, exports and domestic savings did not receive the 
urgent attention from the government they deserved. 
In the years immediately after partition, availability of large sterling balances, 
surplus of foreign exchange from East Pakistan and earnings from the Korean war 
commodity boom enabled West Pakistan to run large external deficits. But with the 
collapse of the Korean boom and a sharp decline in foreign exchange reserves, Pakistan 
was already in the grip of its first foreign exchange crisis in late 1952. 
The signing in 1954 of a Mutual Defence Agreement with the United States 
opened the way for large scale military and economic assistance.  During the three years 
(1955–58) before Ayub Khan’s takeover, economic assistance already totalled $500 
million or 2.8 percent of GDP for the whole of Pakistan. 
The real value of U.S. military assistance in the late 1950s probably approached 
that of economic assistance. The strong political alignment with the U.S. through 
Pakistan’s membership in the Central and South East Asian Treaty Organisations and 
the signing of the Indus Basin Treaty in 1961 between India and Pakistan, under World 
Bank auspices, on the sharing of waters from common rivers, further spurred foreign aid 
inflows. By 1964-65 the balance of payments deficit for Pakistan as a whole, financed 
almost entirely from foreign assistance, had risen to 6.8 percent of GDP.  It would seem 
that Pakistan’s planners, under President Ayub Khan’s direction, rushed headlong to 
grasp the opportunities offered by the availability of larger foreign assistance without 
giving thought to sustainability issues. The Second Plan (1960–65) was quickly revised 
upwards, and public sector development spending expanded more than 40 percent over 
original levels. The revised Second Plan’s (November 1960) assumption that external 
assistance would provide 55 percent of the financing for investment outlays and Indus 
Basin work did not raise any concerns. After the 1965 war with India, both military and 
economic assistance tended to decline. However, as noted above, economic assistance 
again increased during the Bhutto years as grants and loans from oil exporting countries 
in the Middle East were successfully mobilised to finance the much larger oil import bill. 
This encouraged the postponement of necessary energy price adjustments for nearly a 
decade with the result that energy consumption was sustained at unrealistic levels and 
government finances suffered. 
Worker remittances, a critical source of financing the balance of payments during 
the Zia years, were not technically external resources but rather additions to domestic 
savings. Unfortunately, the large remittances did not lead to a lasting and significant 
increase in national savings. It was natural that a large part of the income from the 
remittances was used for consumption. Indeed this growth in consumption contributed 
significantly to the reduction in the incidence of poverty in the 1980s.  But at the macro 
level a large part of the increment to the pool of national savings was pre-empted by the 





throughout the 1980s while public investment declined as a percentage of GDP.  There 
was some reduction in the reliance on foreign savings during 1977–88 because of the 
flood of remittances but a critical opportunity to strengthen self reliance was missed 
because of the structural weakness in the public finances. 
As worker remittances declined and external deficits increased in the 1990s, 
Pakistan again postponed tough decisions on domestic resource mobilisation by relying 
heavily on increase in foreign currency deposits for meeting its foreign exchange needs. 
This was done through greatly liberalising the foreign exchange regime, which dealt a 
healthy blow to the psychology of capital flight. There is nothing intrinsically wrong 
with a liberal foreign exchange system which permits residents to hold currency 
deposits.  However, in Pakistan’s case the growth of foreign currency deposits has been 
promoted through attractive terms and substantial hidden subsidies. The State Bank of 
Pakistan has incurred substantial losses in local currency on account of foreign exchange 
guarantees provided to holders of foreign currency deposits. These losses are estimated 
at Rs 50 billion or well over 2 percent of GNP for the two years 1995 and 1996 and 
represent a quasi-fiscal deficit which is ultimately a charge on public resources.  Without 
these subsidies, foreign currency deposits would have been much less attractive. The 
somewhat artificially sustained additions to foreign currency deposits (and large inflows 
of portfolio investment) enabled continued financing of high levels of current account 
balance of payments in the 1990s.  What was worse, these larger deficits during 1990–
96 were not accompanied by any significant increase in the investment level and largely 
sustained domestic consumption.  
  
Fiscal Policy Failures 
Fiscal policies can play an important role in mobilising domestic resources, 
sustaining directions of development, maintaining price stability and ensuring some 
redistribution of income in favour of the poor.  In Pakistan, effective use of fiscal 
policies has been greatly hampered by continued inelasticity of the tax system, 
competition between defence and development and the consequent emergence of large 
fiscal deficits and the explosive growth in public debt.  As a result, public savings have 
been negligible or negative for long periods. Government current expenditures have 
continued to exceed current revenues ever since 1970 (even though very inadequate 
provisions were made for operation and maintenance expenditures), and the growing 
burden of interest payments has prevented any significant downward adjustment in fiscal 
deficits during the last decade.   
 
Defence Spending 
While the level of tax revenues in Pakistan has also lagged behind other 
developing countries, it is the high level of defence spending since 1970 that has been a Parvez Hasan  366 
critical factor in Pakistan’s inability to generate significant savings in the public sector. 
Defence spending has always been given high priority.  In the first few years after 
partition, defence spending was equal to 85 percent of central government revenues. In 
the first half of the 1950s, defence expenditures exceeded development spending by a 
wide margin.  But concern with demonstrating the soundness of Pakistan’s finances 
meant that overall fiscal policies were conservative and recourse to deficit financing or 
credit creation for the public sector was moderate. But the conflicts among the objectives 
of a strong build up of defence, adequate allocations for development, balanced regional 
development between East and West Pakistan and the desire to keep fiscal deficits small 
had already emerged after the collapse of the Korean boom. Fortunately, the availability 
of large foreign economic and military assistance removed the competition between 
defence and development spending; defence spending in the second half of 1950s was in 
real terms significantly below the level in the first half and had come down to 25 percent 
of total central government expenditure. With the continued availability of US military 
assistance, defence spending rose little over 3 percent per annum in real terms in the five 
years before the 1965 war with India, substantially less than the rate of growth of the 
economy. But following the war with India, defence allocations were given very high 
priority as U.S. military assistance was phased out.  Real defence expenditures almost 
doubled between 1960–65 and 1965–70. This took its toll on development, but the 
government also increased tax efforts to finance additional defence spending. Revenue 
surpluses remained at 2 percent of GDP almost throughout the 1960s. 
After 1970, not only did defence spending increase further sharply as a 
percentage of GDP, but also government non-development spending was not covered by 
government revenues. This became a root cause of fiscal imbalance. Defence 
expenditures in fiscal years 1976 and 1977, the last two years of the Bhutto regime, were 
one-third higher in real terms than in 1969-70 even though the size of the country had 
shrunk, thereby eliminating the need for military establishment in the former East 
Pakistan.  As a percentage of GDP, defence expenditures rose to 5.6 in 1976-77 from 3.8 
and 2.8 of GDP of unified Pakistan respectively in 1969-70 and 1964-65. At the same 
time, the government revenue account turned into a deficit which was close to 2 percent 
of GDP, a sharp contrast to the 1960s when surpluses of 2 percent of GDP had been 
recorded. 
During the Zia period defence spending increased at a real annual rate of over 9 
percent per annum, faster than any other period in Pakistan’s history except the very 
early years.  It also outstripped growth in development spending by a wide margin.  In 
the final two years of Zia’s rule, 1987–88, defence spending constituted 6.7 percent of 
GDP. At the beginning of Zia’s rule, public sector development spending had been more 
than double the level of defence outlays. A decade later development spending had come 
down to the same level as defence. Over the period 1988–97 defence spending did  





decline to 5.1 percent of GDP as financial pressures intensified, but the balance between 
defence and development further worsened. 
 
Taxation Effort 
Whatever the imperatives of national security, sufficient tax and other revenue 
resources could not be mobilised to cover non-development spending. Quite apart from 
the inability of Pakistan’s tax system to influence equity and the pattern of growth 
positively, tax revenues have not kept pace with the admittedly large growth in non-
development spending.  The ratio of taxes to GNP improved only marginally from 13 
percent in the mid-1970s to 14 percent in mid-1990s notwithstanding very substantial 
additional taxation undertaken, especially in recent years.  By 1997–98 they had again 
come down to 13 percent of GDP because of the not fully thought out tax rate reductions 
in March 1997.  The inelasticity of the tax system has persisted as a problem for several 
decades as the base of income tax collection remains narrow; the level of income and 
corporation tax revenues at 1.6 percent of GNP in 1987-88 was not only low but also 
had not increased over the previous decade; the increase to 2.5 percent in 1994-95 was 
made possible mainly by withholding taxes on interest and other income. Meanwhile the 
heavy dependence on foreign trade taxes which emerged following the 1972 devaluation 
has remained largely intact; even in 1995-96 foreign trade taxes including surcharges 
were over 4 percent of GNP. The average rate of import duty on dutiable imports at 35 
percent remained high in 1995-96.  This high level of import taxation had a built in bias 
against exports because it raised the cost of imported inputs for the exporters. 
 
Budget Deficits 
Even though development spending has grown rather slowly since the late 1970s, 
budget deficits have remained large. As Table 5 indicates, fiscal deficits averaged 8 
percent of GDP during 1973–77. They declined somewhat in the early 1980s but were 
again at a high during the final years of Zia’s rule. The reduction since then to around 
6.0 – 6.5 percent in 1996 and 1997 appears to be exaggerated because of the change in 
definition of government spending after 1992. By and large there was little fiscal 
adjustment between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. 
Reflecting the large fiscal deficit, public domestic debt had increased from Rs 58 
billion in mid-1981, to Rs 521 billion in 1988, and to Rs 909 billion in mid-1996, far 
outstripping the growth in external debt.  As a proportion of GDP, domestic debt had 
increased from 21 percent in mid-1981 to 42 percent in mid-1996. There was a 
fundamental difference in the way in which fiscal deficits were financed during the 
1970s and the 1980s.  In the earlier period domestic financing for the budget deficit 
came primarily from money creation. This  led to  immediate pressure on the price level  Parvez Hasan  368 
Table 5 
Fiscal Deficits as Percent of GDP 







Source:  Pakistan Economic Survey, various issues. 
   Note:  The fiscal deficits after 1992 are not strictly comparable with earlier figures because of exclusion 
of net borrowing of major government corporations. One would need to add about 1 percent of 
DP to deficits after 1992 to make them roughly comparable. 
 
and created forced savings.  In the 1980s much greater reliance was placed on domestic 
non-bank borrowing, and inflationary pressures were contained, but this merely 
postponed the consequences of large fiscal deficits. 
During the second half of the 1980s, central government borrowing from non-
bank sources was in excess of Rs. 150 billion or well over 4 percent of GNP. More 
importantly, government borrowing from non-bank sources absorbed more than one-
third private savings during this period. The tapping of private savings to this extent was 
achieved through offering very attractive interest rates and tax breaks.  The tax-free real 
rate of return on Khas deposits was as high was 8 percent during 1985–90, after 
allowing for an inflation rate of 6 percent per annum. The high guaranteed real return on 
government debt as well as the sheer scale of government borrowing from non-bank 
sources crowded out private investment. Private investment in the second half of the 
1980s grew by little over 4 percent per annum compared with 6 percent per annum in the 
first half of the decade. 
Because of the explosion of government domestic debt, it is the increase in 
domestic interest payments which has been the driving force behind the growth in 
government expenditures and thus fiscal deficits since the early 1980s. Interest payments 
on government debt had grown from around 1 percent of GNP in the 1970s to nearly 6 
percent in mid-1990s while the burden of external debt interest payments remained small 
(1.2 percent of GNP).  The rising interest rate burden along with high defence spending 
have imparted great inflexibility to the Pakistan budget.  Interest costs and defence 
spending together absorb about two-thirds of total fiscal revenues.  At the same time, 
development and social expenditures are low and they must increase to meet the woeful 
past neglect of social services and infrastructure.  The essential inelasticity of the tax 





circumstances, the task of reducing fiscal deficit to 4 percent of GNP, considered 
essential to maintain macro-economic stability is likely to prove extremely difficult. 
Thus, relative macro-economic stability, which has had a favourable impact on 
growth in the past, is now threatened because the means through which it was 
attained were not sustainable.
7 
Pakistan’s experience also confirms the importance of two other factors in 
domestic savings; the role assigned to the private sector and the development of the 
financial sector and the capital markets. The dominant role that the state has played in 
the economy and the ambivalence of the attitudes toward the private sector over long 
periods have hampered savings. The periods in which the private sector was given 
encouragement were also those with relatively high private savings. After 1952 when the 
private sector responded to the opportunities for rapid industrialisation, it did reinvest a 
high proportion of the large industrial profits.  Again, in the first half of the 1960s when 
private investment increased nearly three-fold, the marginal savings rate exceeded 20 
percent.  In contrast, the domestic savings rate stagnated during 1972–77, when the 
government’s attitude toward the private sector turned almost hostile.  Private savings 
tended to revive during the 1980s as opportunities for private investment were expanded. 
In the 1990s, however, the growth in private investment at a rate substantially higher 
than public investment does not appear to have been accompanied by a rise in the rate of 
private savings.  The shift of investment from the public to the private sector was 
accompanied simply by a greater reliance by the latter on foreign flows. 
The financial sector and the capital markets also play a key role in mobilising and 
raising the level of savings.  In Pakistan, financial sector development has been 
adversely affected by the dominance of state controlled and owned institutions and 
strong central controls on credit allocations and interest rates till relatively recently. The 
financial sector reforms after 1990 did achieve a degree of interest rate liberalisation, 
moderate reduction in credit subsidies and a move toward more market based 
borrowing.  However, because of acceleration of inflation, interest rates on deposits 
became negative in real terms, and thus there were strong disincentives for financial 
savings. With only limited progress on privatisation, the control of most large 
commercial banks remained in the hand of the state and by all accounts the level of 
political interference in credit allocation decisions increased under the democratically 
elected governments.  The sharp and continuous rise in overdue and bad loans further 
undermined the health of the banking system and its ability to provide adequate rewards 
to savers. The permission for residents to hold foreign currency deposits, which enjoy 
exemptions from zakat and income tax, further reduced the rate of growth of domestic 
7For a detailed analysis of the concepts of sustainable budget deficits and Pakistan’s fiscal 
dilemmas, see Nadeem ul Haq and Peter J. Montiel, “Fiscal Policy Choices and Macroeconomic 
Performance in the Nineties” in Anjum Nasim (1992) Financing Pakistan’s Development in the 1990s. 
Lahore: Lahore University of Management Sciences/Oxford University Press, Karachi. Sadiq Ahmed, 
Explaining Pakistan’s High Growth Performance over the Past Two Decades: Can it be Sustained? 
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 1341, August 1994.) Parvez Hasan  370 
financial assets. Excluding foreign currency deposits, the ratio of M2 to GDP, an 
important indicator of the level of financial development, dropped from 40 percent in 
mid-1988 to 34 percent in mid-1996. The level of financial development in Pakistan not 
only compares unfavourably with other developing countries but also has shown some 
deterioration during the last decade. Unless these trends can be reversed through 
improved efficiency of the banking system, and interest policies and further 
development of capital markets which provide positive real returns to savers, the savings 
leakage in unproductive investments such as land speculation, gold hoarding and capital 
flight will continue. 
 
Foreign Trade Developments 
Successful developing countries not only have high domestic saving rates but 
also have been able to translate high savings into high exports, thus reducing foreign 
trade deficits over time. Linked with its poor domestic savings performance, export 
growth in Pakistan has been uneven, and its foreign trade deficit has remained high. 
In the 1950s, as the country emphasised import substitution and as agricultural 
output stagnated, exports actually tended to decline.  Strong agricultural growth and 
spurts of manufactured goods exports resulted in a growth of nearly 8 percent per annum 
over 1960–93, substantially higher than the growth in GDP of nearly 6 percent over the 
period.  But in recent years exports have tended to stagnate. During the four trade years 
1993–96, export volume growth was slightly negative. Nonetheless, greater export 
orientation of the economy is indicated by the rise in the ratio of exports of goods and 
non-factor services to GDP from 9 percent in 1960 to 16 percent in 1994. 
Successful exporters among developing countries have been able to exploit their 
comparative advantage in labour intensive manufactured exports. World trade in 
manufactured goods has witnessed sustained high growth for four decades. High income 
industrial economies have expanded their manufactured goods imports at a much higher 
pace than the growth in industrial output. The countries that were able to organise 
themselves for large scale manufactured exports and avoided anti-export bias in their 
trade policies were able to take advantage of the expanded opportunities in developed 
country markets. Countries like Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have 
expanded manufactured exports one-hundred fold in less than twenty-five years and 
have all propelled themselves into developed country status largely on the basis of a 
strategy that at least initially focused on exports of labour intensive manufactured goods. 
The performance of other East Asian countries China, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia 
has also been outstanding in this field. China which began its drive for manufactured 
exports only after 1980 now has manufactured exports of over US $100 billion, very 
similar to levels in Taiwan and Korea.  Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia together match 





Missed Export Opportunities 
Seen in the light of these success stories, Pakistan’s expansion of manufactured 
goods exports from US $425 million in 1970 to US $5.6 billion in 1993 looks moderate 
at best.  East Asian countries including the Philippines, and also India, Turkey, Mexico 
were able to expand manufactured exports faster than Pakistan during the last twenty-
five years.  Manufactured exports from Pakistan in 1993 were only a fraction of the level 
of manufactured exports from Korea (US $77 billion), China (US $74 billion), Malaysia 
(US $31 billion), Thailand (US $27 billion), Indonesia (US $18 billion).  It is also 
interesting to note that in 1970 Pakistan’s modest manufactured exports of US $425 
million were about two thirds of the level of Korea and were much larger than exports 
from Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Turkey. Clearly, Pakistan has missed important 
opportunities in a key growth area, not only in competition with the first round exporters 
such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea, but also in relation to the second 
round exporters like China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and, more recently, Mexico 
and Turkey, which have been expanding manufactured exports impressively since 1980. 
The danger now is that relative newcomers in manufactured goods like India, 
Bangladesh, and Eastern European countries, notably Poland and Hungary, will provide 
stiff competition to Pakistan in the future and will make it difficult for Pakistan in the 
future to capture a larger market share. 
 
Weak Export Structure 
The dependence of Pakistan’s exports on raw cotton and cotton yarn remains 
heavy; these exports accounted for 28 percent of export earnings in 1969–70; a quarter 
of a century later in 1994-95 they still accounted for about 20 percent of the total. 
Including cotton cloth and garments, cotton related exports account for one-half of the 
total compared with 45 percent in 1969–70. This means that the performance of the 
export sector is greatly tied with the production of raw cotton. The six-fold increase in 
the quantity of raw cotton and yarn exports from 157,000 tons in 1969-70 to the peak of 
961,000 tons in 1991-92 was linked directly to the four-fold increase in production of 
raw cotton to 2.2 million tons over the period. As raw cotton production fell, on average, 
by over one-third in the next three years, exports of raw cotton and cotton yarn also fell 
roughly in the same proportion. Since there is uncertainty that the very favourable raw 
cotton production trend can be revived, future export expansion cannot rely on raw 
cotton and yarn exports as in the past. 
Within the textile sector, the structure of exports remains weak despite the 
dramatic rise in export of garments since 1980-81. Exports of cotton yarn have 
continued to dominate relative to exports of cotton cloth.  In the first half of the 1970s, 
the value of cotton cloth exports were about 85 percent of yarn exports but by the first 
half of the 1990s they had decreased to two-thirds of yarn exports.  It is well known that Parvez Hasan  372 
the value added in cotton yarn exports is quite limited compared to raw cotton exports. 
The duty on export of raw cotton for long periods provided a large subsidy to producers 
of cotton textiles especially yarn and thus artificially stimulated profitability of yarn 
production.  Credit subsidies to the mills which have run into financial problems have 
also sustained uneconomic production. With the phasing out of the export duty on cotton 
in 1991-92 and indeed with the emergence of the need to import raw cotton, the cotton 
textile industry can no longer rely on cheap availability of raw cotton. This is the root 
cause of the crisis being faced by the textile industry.  In tackling this crisis, the 
government needs to ensure that credit subsidies do not perpetuate production which is 
inherently uneconomic. 
In order to improve the structure of exports, the dependence on cotton yarn 
exports which still account for nearly 20 percent of value of total exports needs to be 
reduced.  Fortunately, ready made garments and hosiery exports have increased over 
twelve-fold in real terms since 1980-81 and can be counted upon to overtake yarn 
exports and provide a steady source of growth of export revenues. 
 
Export Policy Failures 
There are three basic reasons why Pakistan did not make fuller use of the 
opportunities offered by the explosive growth in world trade in manufactured goods. In 
the first place, the development strategy did not emphasise exports sufficiently. Second, 
the trade policy distortions with relatively high duties on intermediate products 
discouraged processing for exports.  There has been a general anti-export bias resulting 
from the high cost of inputs required for exports and the relative attraction of the 
domestic market.  Third, in the industrial strategy, there has been an excessive emphasis 
on processing of domestic raw materials, notably cotton. Policy failures are a 
fundamental reason why major opportunities were missed in exports and why the 
structure of export remains so dependent on cotton based exports. 
In the period immediately after partition, import substitution was rightly 
emphasised.  However, with the approaching of self-sufficiency in cotton textiles in the 
second half of the 1950s, export development had become vital.  However, continued 
availability of the protected market in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and the 
availability of large scale foreign assistance, diluted this urgency.  Pakistan was, 
however, not unique among developing countries in attaching low priority to export 
development in the early period.  The target for export growth during both the First Plan 
(1955–60) and the Second Plan (1960–65) was only 3 percent per annum, in nominal 
terms. The pessimism about exports were probably linked to low expectations about 
agriculture and the widespread view at the time that there were serious international 
demand limitations on manufactured good exports. The strategic failure was not to learn 
from the manufactured goods exports experience of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore in the 1960s, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia in the early 





Even though manufactured exports from Pakistan did rise sharply in the 1960s, 
this growth was to a large extent artificial because it was achieved through very high 
rates of effective subsidy on cotton textile exports which largely substituted for raw 
cotton exports.  The export bonus scheme introduced in January 1959 as a temporary 
expedient to boost exports, perpetuated a system of multiple exchange rates which lasted 
till 1972.  This system caused major economic distortions which acted against the 
normal process of industrial deepening and structural change. It is interesting to note that 
the massive formal devaluation that was undertaken in May 1972 failed to remove the 
basic anomalies that had crept in Pakistan’s trade and exchange system in the 1950s and 
the 1960s, partly because they were so deeply rooted and had lasted so long. Because the 
wedge between the effective export and import exchange rate remained large, policies 
continued generally to favour import substitution and discriminate against exports.  Even 
though manufactured goods exports received a higher effective exchange rate than 
primary products because of the heavy taxation on the latter, it was not enough to offset 
the relative attractiveness of the domestic market resulting from a high degree of 
effective protection to industry. The heavy foreign trade taxation was soon confined to 
imports and this heavy taxation of imports clearly made exports of manufactured goods 
based on imported raw materials uncompetitive. The system of export rebates has never 
been greatly effective in Pakistan. The high rates of import duty have persisted; the 
average rate of duty on dutiable imports remained around 35 percent in 1996. Selective 
export subsidies and substantial real devaluation of the rupee, during the Zia years, did 
help to expand manufactured exports after their extremely disappointing performance in 
the 1970s.  But the fundamental reliance on cotton textiles and related exports persisted, 
and they remained heavily dependent on the subsidy on domestic sales of raw cotton. 
 
Agricultural Performance and Policies 
Overall economic growth has been and continues to be influenced greatly by 
trends in agriculture. Periods of high agricultural growth have generally also been 
periods of high GDP growth. 
In the 1950s when large scale manufacturing growth, starting from a small base, 
recorded phenomenal growth rates of 20 percent per annum, the overall economy 
stagnated because agricultural growth was poor (1.4 percent per annum). The push for 
industrial growth was clearly over done in the early years.  More balanced policies 
would have moderated inefficiencies in the use of resources resulting from excessive 
protection and also moderated the income inequalities both among economic groups 
between the regions that resulted from a very steep rise in industrial profits.   
The 1960s saw a surge in the agricultural growth rate to 5 percent per annum, 
exceeded internationally only by Malaysia and Thailand. This improvement was the 
result of significant investment in water resources, both in public and the private sector,  
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improved incentives for farmers and a remarkably coordinated and effective government 
response to the opportunities offered by the availability of improved varieties of wheat 
and rice after 1967. These key factors were responsible for the dramatic turn around in 
agriculture which provided important underpinnings for the expansion of domestic 
industry and exports. 
Again during 1977–88, the recovery in agricultural growth to nearly 4 percent per 
annum from a dismal 2 percent during 1972–77 was an important element in overall 
expansion. Agricultural production during this period was helped by large augmentation 
of irrigation water supplies from Tarbela and the dramatic increase in the domestic 
production and use of fertilisers. The remarkable expansion in cotton productivity during 
the 1980s and early 1990s, linked both to better seeds and to liberalisation of pesticides, 
also continued to sustain agricultural growth which remained at 4.5 percent per annum 
during 1988–96. 
As Table 6 indicates, Pakistan’s agricultural growth rate over 1960–93 of around 
4  percent  per  annum was exceeded only by Malaysia and Thailand. However, on a per  
 
Table 6 
Agricultural Growth Rates, 1960–95 
(In Percent per Annum) 
Countries  1960–1970 1970–1980 1980–1995 1960–1995 
South Asia      
Bangladesh  2.7 0.6 2.2 1.9 
India  1.9 1.8 3.1 2.4 
Pakistan  4.9 2.3 3.9 3.7 
Sri  Lanka  3.0 2.8 2.3 2.7 
East Asia      
China  0.8 2.6 5.4 3.2 
Indonesia  2.9 4.1 3.3 3.4 
Korea  4.4 2.7 2.3 3.0 
Malaysia  5.5 5.0 3.4 4.5 
Philippines 4.3 4.0 1.2 2.9 
Thailand  5.6 4.4 3.7 4.4 
Middle East       
Egypt  2.9 2.8 1.7 2.3 
Morocco  4.7 1.1 2.4 2.7 
Turkey  2.5 3.4 1.2 2.2 
Latin America      
Argentina  1.8 2.5 0.8 1.8 
Brazil  n.a. 4.2 3.1 3.5 
Mexico  4.5 3.2 0.5 2.4 
Source: World Bank, World Development Reports. 





capita basis, agricultural output growth in Pakistan of less than 1 percent per annum 
since 1960 does not compare favourably with most East Asian countries including China 
and Korea.  Still, Pakistan’s agricultural record has been clearly better than that of India, 
Bangladesh and Egypt. The more serious issue appears to be that, as in exports, the past 
pattern of agricultural growth, does not appear sustainable. 
 
Sources of Agricultural Growth 
To a considerable extent, the increase in agricultural output has come from the 
expansion of cropped areas due to enormous increases in availability of inputs, 
especially water. The improvements in efficiency
8 have been relatively limited and 
yields per hectare have shown only modest increases over long periods. The important 
exceptions were the dramatic increase in cotton yields during the 1980s and wheat and 
rice yield improvements in the second half of the 1960s. The doubling of cotton 
production between 1982-83 and 1990-91, mainly through productivity improvements 
achieved through new varieties and de-control of pesticides, underpinned the strong 
agricultural performance in the 1980s. Without the spectacular growth in cotton, 
agricultural growth in the 1980s would have been disappointing.  Unfortunately, cotton 
production has suffered in recent years due to viruses; production in 1997-98 was nearly 
30 percent below the peak reached in 1991-92. 
Pakistan’s reliance on an extensive pattern of development in agriculture 
becomes clear from the large increases in area under irrigated crops by 1.8 percent per 
annum since 1950-51. This increase in area  has been in turn been made possible a large 
increase in availability of water. Between 1960-61 and 1990-91, the availability of water 
for rabi crops trebled, while supply for kharif crops more than doubled. The overall 
increase in water availability over 3 percent per annum over the three decades was 
attributable both to the extensive use of private tubewells to exploit ground water 
resources and large public investments in water storage and irrigation.  The construction 
of Mangla and Tarbela Dams and the large-scale Indus Basin replacement works in the 
1960s and early 1970s not only reduced the variability in water availability but also 
added to total supplies from the irrigation system. 
Sustainability of the past pattern of agricultural growth is in serious doubt 
because Pakistan cannot expect major increases in water availability in the foreseeable 
future.
9 No investments in storage of water are underway at moment and, in any case, 
large projects like Kalabagh Dam would take a decade to complete once initiated. 
8The best measure of productivity is total factor productivity (TFP) which isolates the effect of 
input growth on output expansion.  Two recent studies find that TFP has stagnated or even declined in 
post-Green Revolution Pakistan, i.e. the period since the mid-1970s.  The studies are cited in Byerly, 
Derek (1994) Agricultural Productivity in Pakistan: Problems and Potential. Prepared for the World Bank, 
Washington, D. C., Agricultural Sector Review. 
9For an analysis of the constraints facing Pakistan’s agriculture, see Rashid Faruquee, Pakistan’s 
Agriculture Sector. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1407, (January 1995).  Parvez Hasan  376 
Ground water development through private tubewells may be reaching a saturation 
point.  Similarly, the spurts of wheat and rice yields made possible during the green 
revolution and the exceptional improvement in productivity of cotton during the last 
decade may not be easy to repeat.  Future agricultural growth will have to come from 
improving the efficiency use of major inputs such as water and fertiliser as well as 
greater agricultural diversification.  More effective use of water resources would require 
substantial increases in water charges coupled with investments in improvement of 
delivery efficiency of the irrigation and appropriate on-farm investments in land 
levelling etc. At present, water charges cover less than 50 percent of operations and 
maintenance costs of the irrigation system let alone recovery of capital cost.  Thus, there 
are insufficient incentives to conserve water and undertake on-farm investments. 
Improvement in the technical efficiency with which agricultural inputs are used would 
also require strengthening of human resource base in agriculture. The low level of 
literacy and investments in education appear to have been a major drag on agricultural 
productivity.  Finally, there is considerable room for better resource allocation within 
agriculture. Valuing inputs and outputs at international prices, cotton, wheat and basmati 
rice are among the most efficient crops for Pakistan.
10 In contrast, sugarcane production 
is inefficient.  The estimates of effective protection indicate that there is substantial 
negative protection for wheat, rice and cotton and high positive protection for sugarcane. 
 Correcting the price distortions which result mainly from the system of agricultural 
support prices would lead to shifts away from sugarcane to wheat, rice and cotton.  The 
system of output prices also resulted in transfer from agricultural producers of over 6 
percent of gross agricultural product in the recent past.
11 These transfers were only partly 
offset by subsidies on inputs, including irrigation, fertiliser and credit. On a net basis, 
agriculture is no longer more heavily taxed than other sectors, though the implicit net 
taxation of agriculture was heavy in the 1980s.  But the important point is that keeping 
output prices below world prices and offsetting this by input subsidies was a particularly 
inefficient and inequitable way of transferring resources from agriculture.
12 Input 
subsidies lead to a wasteful use of scarce resources while depressing output prices 
discourages production. Further reform of the trade and taxation regime for agriculture 
can have positive output and revenue effects while mitigating the inequities of the 
present system which discriminates against the small farmers. 
 
Large-scale Manufacturing Growth 
Large scale manufacturing has had a more chequered history than agriculture. 
The extraordinary high rate of manufacturing growth in the fifties was due 
10Longmire, Jim and Pascale Debord (1993) Agricultural Pricing and Comparative Advantage in 
Pakistan: An Update to 1991-92. Prepared for the World Bank, South Asia Regions, Agricultural Operations. 
11Estimate for 1992-93. Tayyeb Shabbir (1994) Agricultural Prices in Pakistan. Prepared for the World 
Bank. The estimates for earlier years were much higher. 
12The World Bank (1994) Pakistan: A Strategy for Sustainable Agricultural Growth. Washington, 





principally to two factors: (i) the abnormally low level of manufacturing activity that 
Pakistan had at partition, relative to what one would expect from a country of Pakistan’s 
size and income level and (ii) government policies which ensured a very high rate of 
profit in manufacturing through high domestic protection.  A good deal, though not all, 
of the protection initially afforded to industry could be justified on grounds that industry 
was in its infancy. The excessive protection afforded to industry and extensive 
quantitative restriction on imports resulted not so much in the wrong industries being 
established but rather excessive profits being generated for the industrialists at the cost 
mainly of urban consumers and the rural population.  Lower agricultural growth and a 
widening income gap between the rich and the poor were the real consequences of 
excessive protection to industry. 
  But by the early 1960s, there was a need to expose traditional industries such as 
textiles to more external competition and to stress both exports and development of 
intermediate and capital goods industries.  This required an exchange rate adjustment as 
well as scaling down of protection for final consumer goods industries. This was not 
done.  Instead, through a combination of a complicated multiple exchange rate scheme 
and continued reliance on an extensive system of import controls, Pakistan managed to 
provide its industrial sector the double advantage of substantial protection against 
imports and substantial incentives for exports. While the Export Bonus scheme was 
instrumental in a very sharp increase in manufactured goods exports, this growth was 
achieved at a very high economic cost. The effective rate of subsidy on export of 
manufactured goods in 1967-68 was well over 100 percent and even higher for cotton 
textiles. The increase in cotton textiles, especially yarn exports, to a large extent 
substituted for raw cotton exports. Given the large profit margins in standard cotton 
textiles there were few pressures for moving into areas of greater value added such as 
garments or mixed textiles and even less for moving into intermediate products or capital 
goods; imports could come in at the over-valued exchange rate. Under this protected 
regime, large scale manufacturing growth was at 16 percent per annum during the first 
half of the 1960s and remained at 10 percent in the second half of the 1960s 
notwithstanding the emergence of foreign exchange shortages.  But in economic terms, 
the lack of incentives for improving efficiency and introducing structural change proved 
costly. Also the incentive system continued to discriminate against agriculture.  In social 
terms, the high burden of industrialisation on the consumer and high unearned industrial 
profits may have contributed to the unrest in the late 1960s. 
Bhutto’s experiment with socialism dealt a major blow to large scale 
manufacturing development in the private sector.  Even though the nationalisation in the 
industrial sector in January 1972 affected less than 20 percent of the value added in the 
manufacturing sector, the indiscipline and labour militancy resulting from the new 
labour policy, the nationalisation of commercial banks and the generally hostile attitude 
of the government towards the private sector resulted in a precipitous drop in private Parvez Hasan  378 
investment in medium and large scale industry. By 1976-77 real private investment in 
this sector was only about 40 percent of the level in 1969-70.  However, under Bhutto 
the public sector undertook very large industrial investments including the steel mill, 
fertiliser and cement plants and several sugar and textile mills.  Public sector investment 
in industry rose nearly ten-fold in real terms between 1969-70 and 1976-77. But this 
sizable investment was concentrated in long gestation projects which involved relatively 
little job creation and in the case of steel mills was to prove of dubious value. The 
immediate effect of Bhutto’s policies was that large scale manufacturing grew only by 
2.8 percent per annum during 1972–77 following an actual fall (6 percent) during 1970–
72, reflecting disruption caused by political disturbances and the eventual separation of 
East Pakistan. 
Overall manufacturing sector growth during 1977–88, the Zia years, recovered to 
9 percent per annum, compared with 3.7 percent growth recorded during 1972–77. 
Several factors were behind the rapid industrial expansion.  First, the very large public 
sector investments in industry which were started under Bhutto and continued in the 
early Zia period resulted in major increases in steel, cement, fertiliser, and vehicle 
production.  Second, the investment climate for the private sector was improved by 
providing guarantees against future nationalisation, clearer demarcation of activities 
between the private and public sector, relaxation of investment controls, and additional 
tax concessions. While there was no wholesale de-nationalisation, nationalised 
enterprises were transferred to former owners on a case by case basis. Third, the 
incentives for manufactured goods exports were strengthened by the introduction of 
flexible exchange rate policies and strengthening of export rebates and subsidies.  As a 
result, private sector investment grew rapidly and by the late 1980s had risen to over 90 
percent of total industrial investment in contrast to a little over 25 percent in 1976-77. 
The revival of private industrial investment was particularly important for 
addition to capacity in traditional industries such as cotton textiles which have a quick 
pay off.  The rapid growth of raw cotton production also stimulated the cotton textile 
industry.  Unfortunately, the structure of incentives continued to favour relatively simple 
and limited value added processing, notable cotton yarn production.  Continued export 
taxation of raw cotton ensured availability of the raw material at well below international 
prices and therefore large profits could be made in yarn production without much benefit 
to the economy.  The weakness in the industrial structure was reflected in the pattern of 
exports.  Just as in the 1960s, the manufactured exports’ boom of the 1980s was 
narrowly linked to the expansion of raw cotton and excessive incentives for cotton 
textiles. As a result, the share of cotton and cotton based exports actually increased very 
sharply from around 40 percent in 1979-80 to nearly 60 percent in 1989-90.  The export 
difficulties being experienced in the mid-1990s were directly related to the weakness in 
the structure of exports that developed in the 1980s.  As raw cotton production stumbled 





uncompetitiveness of a large segment of this important industry became more obvious. 
Large-scale manufacturing growth was only 4.8 percent per annum during 1988–
96 and slowed down further to 3 percent per annum after 1994. The slow down in 
manufacturing was notwithstanding a more than doubling of private real investment in 
large scale manufacturing (while public investment remained constant) over 1990–96. It 
reflected not only the structural problems in cotton textiles but also the poor performance 
in manufactured exports and greater inroads by imports. The latter two were due to the 
failure to adjust the value of the exchange rate in a timely fashion to offset the effect of 
higher domestic inflation on the competitiveness of exports and to cushion the impact of 
import liberalisation measures after 1990 on industry. The main point is that even more 
than in agriculture, future growth in manufacturing had become more problematical in 
the 1990s. 
 
Distribution of Growth Benefits 
Economic growth is not an end in itself.  It is merely a means to improve 
consumption standards, human welfare, and quality of life.  The wide distribution of 
gains from economic growth is thus a critical test of economic performance. The 
distribution of growth benefits can be looked at in several ways, which are closely 
related but nevertheless distinct. These inter-related aspects include the impact of growth 
on job creation, the effect of rising average incomes on incidence of absolute poverty, 
and the access of the general population to social services, such as health, education and 
safe water supply which contribute to the level of human development. In an overall 
sense, the distribution of growth benefits can most clearly be seen through change in the 
pattern of income distribution. 
How does Pakistan fare on the distribution of growth benefits?  How widely has 
prosperity been shared among the population? Our analysis suggests at best a mixed 
performance based on the following six broad conclusions: (1) Though income 
distribution has tended to improve during periods of high growth and benefited from 
large worker remittances in 1980s, the overall trend appears to be toward widening 
income disparities. (2) There has been a definite reduction in the incidence of poverty 
over time but because of the enormous growth in population, the total number of poor 
now estimated at over 40 million has shown a dramatic increase of 125–150 percent 
since partition. (3) Meaningful job creation has not kept pace with the growth in the 
labour force. The high share (50 percent) of the labour force still employed in 
agriculture and the small share of modern sector employment (less than 20 percent) 
suggest a great deal of under employment or employment at very low wages. (4) 
Inadequate progress in tightening the labour market is also reflected in the average real 
wages growth, estimated at 1.2–1.5 percent per annum over 1950–95, lagging behind 
the rate of increase in per capita incomes of 2 percent per annum.  (5) Furthermore,  
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with the slow down of emigration after the early 1980s, real wages have tended to 
stagnate since 1985. (6) In terms of human development, Pakistan has fallen far behind 
other countries on the subcontinent, notwithstanding its better economic growth. 
In discussing Pakistan’s record on equity and the six points above, it is necessary 
to analyse the role of policies which prevented better results and to examine the 
implication of the present position for future development. Even though there are 
problems with the availability and the reliability of income distribution data, it is useful 
conceptually to begin the analysis with the main elements affecting income distribution 
in Pakistan. Early data on Pakistan’s income distribution are not available.  However, 
several factors suggest that incomes were not very unequal at partition notwithstanding 
the very large concentration of land holdings among the large landowners. In 
comparison with India, for instance, industrial development was limited, and both the 
entrepreneurial and professional incomes were not large. On the other hand, the 
phenomenon of landless labour did not exist on a large scale except in Sindh.  It appears 
that income distribution in Pakistan has become more unequal overtime as a result of a 
number of factors.  The degree of inequality in agriculture has not lessened even though 
the land distribution has improved somewhat. The rise of the industrial class has 
substantially added to inequality, especially because protected industry has enjoyed high 
profits the government policies have not had much success in taxing corporate profits or 
re-distributing incomes through fiscal means.  Strong reliance on economic controls for 
large periods of Pakistan history has meant large economic rents for groups with access 
to foreign exchange, credit and trade and investment permits.  Real estate development 
and especially the very steep rises in the prices of urban land have meant large windfall 
gains for property owners who more often that not acquired land initially on the basis of 
allocation rather than market purchase.  On the other side of the income spectrum, there 
does not appear to have been an increase in the share of wages in national income. Wage 
employment has risen only moderately. Real wages of unskilled workers have risen but 
over long periods have lagged behind the growth in per capita incomes. The data suggest 
that since partition real wages have more than doubled indicating an average annual 
growth of 1.5 percent. Even if some allowance is made for the understatement in the 
official price statistics, wages would appear to have grown at least 1.2 percent per 
annum.  There has been no tightening of the labour market; indeed open unemployment, 
though still low at around 5 percent of labour force, has crept up from around 2 percent 
at the end of 1960. 
 
Income Distribution Movements 
The data on household income distribution, available since 1963-64, supports the 
hypothesis of at least a moderate increase in inequality. The household income share of 
the lowest 20 percent, though it has fluctuated over time, was at 5.7 percent in 1990-





percent in 1968-69. Over 1964–91, the ratio of highest 20 percent to the lowest 20 
percent increased from 7.1 to 8.6.  
The income distribution data also reveal that periods of substantial improvement, 
1964–71 and 1979–88, were followed by periods of deterioration, 1971–79, and 1988–
91. While the data on income distribution based on household income and expenditures 
survey is not very reliable as an indicator of the degree of income concentration, since it 
definitely understates incomes of high income groups the fluctuation over time does 
make some sense in terms of economic aggregates. The reduction in the income 
inequalities in the 1960s can be explained by the high growth rates of both agriculture 
and total output. There was a definite trickle down effect of high growth. The 
deterioration in income distribution during 1970–79, notwithstanding the rise in real 
wages in urban areas, probably reflects poor agricultural performance.
13 The recovery in 
the share of the bottom 20 percent income receivers by 1988 was no doubt influenced by 
high growth and worker remittances during the 1980s.  It is not altogether surprising that 
income distribution data show worsening after 1988 because in this period growth 
slowed down, inflation accelerated and real wages tended to fall. 
 
Poverty Incidence 
But while the relative income share of bottom 20 percent or 40 percent of the 
population may have tended to drop over time, there is little doubt that absolute income 
and consumption per head have increased broadly.  According to a recent World Bank 
report on Pakistan Poverty Assessment, in spite of the rapid pace of population growth, 
there has been a sharp decline in the incidence of consumption poverty from 46 percent 
in 1984-85 to 34 percent in 1990-91. The report suggests that there was also a decline in 
poverty incidence between the early 1970s and the early 1980s due to a rise in real 
wages.  This implies that the absolute poverty incidence was over 50 percent as late as 
the early 1970s. This is broadly consistent with other studies. Naseem (1986:180) 
suggests that the incidence of poverty in rural areas dropped from 54 percent in 1963-64 
to 46 percent in 1969-70 but had increased to 55 percent by 1971-72.
14 Irfan and Amjad 
estimate rural poverty incidence at 54 percent in 1969-70 declining to 41 percent in 
1979.
15  However, the price deflators used in their study somewhat under state inflation 
the 1970s and thus under state the extent of poverty in 1979-80. 
Since 70 percent of the population still lives in the rural areas, sustained 
agricultural growth has been an important factor in poverty alleviation. The dramatic rise 
in the production of cotton after 1983-84 was a critical factor in the rise in real wages of 
13Jawaid Azfar, M. Haq and Baqai (eds). p.  49. 
14S. M. Naseem, “Rural Poverty and Landlessness in Pakistan”. In Mahbub ul Haq and Moin Baqai 
(eds) Employment, Distribution and Basic Needs in Pakistan. Lahore: Progressive Publishers. 
15M. Irfan and Rashid Amjad, “Poverty in Rural Pakistan”. In Haq and Baqai (eds) Employment, 
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agricultural workers in the Punjab till the early 1990s. The role of out migration in 
raising real wages in the 1970s and supplementing incomes through remittances from 
abroad has also been a key factor in reducing poverty though its impact is difficult to 
quantify. The net current private transfers from abroad which rose from around 2 percent 
of GDP in the early 1970s to the peak of 9 percent in the early 1980s dropped to 4.5 
percent of GDP during 1992-93 to 1994-95 and this declining trend is likely to continue. 
The contribution of these factors which have been important in the past in poverty 
reduction may be more limited in the future. 
While the poverty reduction has been notable, the incidence of poverty—about 
one-third of the population—is still high especially compared to East Asian countries. 
Also, there can be little satisfaction that poverty in Pakistan has dropped faster than in 
other developing countries, except East Asia. The fact is that per capita growth in 
Pakistan has also been substantially higher than in most other developing countries 
outside East Asia.  It can be argued that with better economic policies, Pakistan would 
have enjoyed not only higher growth but more equitable growth. In any case, the 
preponderance of poverty in society cannot be dismissed lightly.  The number of poor is 
large and has been growing. The incidence of poverty in West Pakistan
16 at 
independence did not exceed 60 percent of the population; the estimates for India place 
poverty incidence at 55 percent.
17  So at the most the number of absolute poor in the 
present day Pakistan was around 18 million in 1947. With the current poverty incidence, 
as estimated by the World Bank at around one-third, the number of poor presently are 
well over 40 million. This widespread poverty is a root cause of social problems and 
tensions. And the huge increase in the absolute number of the poor may explain the 
breakdown of law and order in the country. 
 
Human Development 
Low income and consumption levels are only one aspect of poverty.  As is well 
known, the human development indicators for Pakistan are abysmal and compare very 
unfavourably with the average low income economies.  The literacy rate in Pakistan was 
36 percent in 1993 compared with 60 percent for low income economies. Female 
literacy was only 21 percent compared with 33 percent in India.  Life expectancy at birth 
and infant mortality rates in Pakistan also compare unfavourably with other low income 
economies.  The lag, however, is most serious in education.  The Gross primary 
enrolment ratio in 1987 at 46 percent was only moderate higher than in 1970 (40 
percent).  Since then there has been a distinct improvement. Even so Pakistan’s gross 
16It appears highly unlikely that poverty was reduced in the 1950s because per capita income growth 
was negligible and agricultural growth was poor.  It can thus be assumed that poverty incidence in 1947 was not 
much higher than the reported estimates for the early 1960s of around 55 percent. 
17The Economist (London) (August16–22, 1997) indicates that the population in India below the 
poverty line in 1947 was 55 percent of the total but had dropped to 39 percent by 1987-88, and declined 





enrolment ratio of 65 percent in 1993 compared quite unfavourably with that of 
Bangladesh. 
Why has Pakistan lagged so far behind other developing countries including 
India and Bangladesh in social and human development? Initial conditions, high 
population growth, low priority given to human resource development by governing 
elites, excessive focus on urban areas and higher education at the cost of the neglect of 
rural areas and primary education, ineffective use of resources, poorly implemented 
plans, excessive centralisation, and pre-occupation with short term goals have all 
contributed to one of the stark failures in Pakistan’s development. The policy failures 
were compounded over time and performance in some cases actually deteriorated. For 
instance, in basic education there was less progress in the 1980s than either in the 1950s 
or the 1960s.  In social policies, as in other policy areas, Pakistan was not quick to learn 
from experience and as a result, did not take timely corrective actions. 
The first point that needs to be emphasised is that Pakistan faced at partition in 
1947 very poor initial conditions.  Total primary school enrolment in West Pakistan in 
1948-49  was only 0.6 million, indicating a gross primary enrolment ratio of only about 
15–20 percent compared to 30 percent in East Pakistan.  Only 5-6 percent of school age 
girls were in primary school. Starting from this low level, primary school enrolment 
grew by over 10 percent per annum to 1.89 million in 1959-60.  It expanded almost as 
fast during the period of the Second Plan to 3.0 million in 1964-65, and the primary 
school enrolment ratio improved to 36 percent.  However, after the 1965 war with India 
and increased defence spending, the education sector faced a sharp cut in expenditure 
and primary education was cut disproportionately. Primary school enrolment growth 
slowed down to 5 percent per annum during the Third Plan and surprisingly enough the 
rate did not recover significantly during the Bhutto years. During the Zia years (1977–
88), primary school enrolment slowed down to 3.2 percent per annum only slightly 
faster than the rate of population growth.  Clearly the momentum in primary education 
that was lost in the mid-1960s was never quite regained. 
A great deal of responsibility for failures in basic education can be traced back to 
the decision to nationalise private educational institutions in 1972 under Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto even though the primary schools were not effected.  As a direct consequence of 
the nationalisation decision, the management capacity of the government was over 
extended, the competition for resources within the education sector deepened the urban 
and higher education bias and thus the quick development of basic education and 
literacy was hampered.  It is interesting to note that total government expenditure on 
education actually increased from 1.6 percent to 2.0 percent of GNP over 1972–77 and 
further to 2.7 percent over 1977–88.  But only about one-third of education expenditure 
was directed to the primary level under Bhutto, and this proportion was even lower 
during the Zia years.  It is also significant that the neglect of basic education under Zia 
occurred despite the brave noises made about its priority in 1983 in the Sixth Plan Parvez Hasan  384 
(1983–88). Obviously, the plans were not monitored closely. The cuts in spending 
continued to fall heavily on the social sectors.  The introduction of iqra surcharge on 
imports earmarked for on education in 1985-86 budget did raise education expenditures 
but evidently had only limited impact on primary education spending. The structural 
issues in education arising from the 1972 nationalisation were not tackled in the 1980s. 
The Zia government did allow new private schools but did not address the broader 
question of the role of private sector in education even though the deterioration in the 
quality of public education had become quite evident. The Sixth Plan was silent on the 
subject of private education. 
Another underlying problem has been that higher education has continued to pre-
empt a large share of public education expenditures. However, the large and growing 
subsidies to the urban middle class have ultimately been self defeating because the 
quality of higher public education has dropped precipitously. For nearly five decades 
after independence, fees for the government colleges and universities did not increase 
much if at all even though the general price level had increased over 20 times. The low 
cost recovery has contributed to the financial problems in higher education. 
Notwithstanding the large share of public education resources devoted to higher 
education, the number of teachers in higher and professional education grew only four- 
fold over 1965–95 while enrolments expanded over six-fold.  The declining quality of 
public education has led to a shift to the private educational institutions where the fees 
are fifty to one hundred times those charged by public colleges and universities. A much 
higher rate of cost recovery may help to improve the efficiency of both public and 
private sector institutions by increasing effective competition between the two which is 
sadly lacking at present. 
Inefficient use of resources has also adversely affected the education system, 
especially at the primary level.  Spending on buildings has taken priority over number of 
teachers or other aids to education. Drop out rates are high. The increasing politicisation 
of educational allocations especially under the democratic regimes has meant that the site 
selection for schools and hiring of teachers has not always been based on merit. 
In the ultimate analysis, the failure to make primary education universal even 
after fifty years of independence is a societal failure resulting from feudal dominance in 
rural areas, the urban middle classes’ pre-emption of resources, high level of defence 
spending and lack of sufficient demand for basic education, especially girls’ education. 
Had the demand for primary education been very strong it would not have been possible 
for politicians and technocrats to ignore this sector for so long.  In the case of boys, the 
opportunity cost of time spent in school and in the case of girls, cultural attitudes 
especially in rural areas have hampered growth of primary enrolment.  In 1993 female 
primary enrolment ratio at 49 percent still compared unfavourably with the boys ratio of 
80 percent.  In the rural areas less than one-third of primary school age girls were in 





Long-term Consequences of Neglect of Basic Education 
The neglect of basic education will continue to have consequences for Pakistan’s 
growth and political stability for the next several decades. According to the 1951 census 
the literacy rate was around 20 percent.  Since then the literacy ratio has increased to 36 
percent.  But over the period the number of illiterate persons (10 years or older) has 
trebled from less than 20 million to over 60 million.  This absolute number is likely to 
grow further well into the 21st century even if universal primary education is achieved 
during the next fifteen years. 
The low level of educational attainment has clear consequences for future growth 
since the lack of skills would hamper growth in productivity. The political and social 
consequences of persistence of high level of illiteracy could be even more serious since 
they will stand in the way of a movement to a meaningful democracy. The lag in the 
education of women would also continue to limit the effectiveness of efforts at 
population control.  Clearly Pakistan’s inability to slow down the rate of population 
growth has effected the growth in per capita incomes adversely.  Indications are that it 
will not be easy to slow down the future rate of population growth quickly. The present 
fertility rate in Pakistan of 5.2 compares very unfavourably with that of Bangladesh (3.5) 
and India (3.2), which have already succeeded to slowing down population growth 
considerably.  In Pakistan, very high rates of illiteracy among women (77 percent) and  
the low rate of participation of women in the labour force limit the demand for family 
planning services. The desired family size is still 4 in Pakistan as compared with the 
desired family size of 2 in Bangladesh.
18 Unless there is a dramatic improvement in 
women’s education (and status in the society), population control efforts will not be 
successful even if the family planning services can be made available more effectively 
than in the past. 
 
Employment 
Job creation is a major source of income generation.  Labour force growth in 
Pakistan over the last thirty years has averaged 2.6 percent per annum, lower than the 
population growth of 3 percent per annum partly reflecting the growing number of 
young people who are either studying or still not of the working age. The growth in 
employment has by and large kept pace with the growth in the labour force though in the 
last decade the rate of open unemployment has crept up.  But as economic growth 
slowed down, employment growth also declined to 2.4 percent per annum during 1985–
95 from the peak of 2.9 percent in 1975–85. Close to 40 percent of the increase in jobs, 
i.e. over 6 million jobs, during the last thirty years has been in agriculture. The share of 
agricultural employment in the total has dropped only slowly from 60 percent in the 
18These numbers were quoted at an Islamabad conference (April 1997) by Attiya Inyatullah, a 
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mid-1960s to 50 percent in mid-1980s. Jobs in manufacturing and mining have 
increased very slowly; less than a million jobs have been added in the last twenty five 
years and the share of manufacturing employment has decreased from over 15 percent in 
the late 1960s to less than 11 percent in mid-1990s. Further, most of the increase was in 
small-scale manufacturing.  Of the 11 million jobs created during last thirty years outside 
agriculture, over 8 million have been in construction, trade and other sectors. It would 
appear that the bulk of growth in jobs has been in the informal sector where wages are 
low. Evidence about relatively high paying jobs in the modern sector is less clear.  In any 
case, the large scale organised sector has not been in the lead in providing employment. 
This cannot but have adverse effects on the growth of future employment. Had export 
led manufacturing growth been emphasised, labour intensive industries would have 
shown not only higher growth rates of output but also higher rates of job growth.  In a 
real sense, the neglect of opportunities for exports of labour intensive manufactured 
goods limited the possibilities of a more broad based income and employment growth. 
One can conclude, therefore, that while Pakistan has succeeded in attaining a 
significant growth in living standards notwithstanding a nearly quadrupling of the 
population, it has failed in dealing with the social consequences of the unprecedented 
growth in population in basic education, job creation and poverty alleviation. The large 
increase in the absolute number of poor, illiterate and potentially unemployed poses a 
threat to the social and political order. The dangers inherent in the situation are only 
dimly perceived. Deepening and broadening of social programmes to ensure a more 
equitable distribution of growth benefits than in the past is clearly necessary, but 
sustained economic growth which has provided a fundamental source of societal 
cohesion so far may in itself been in danger because of the weaknesses in the policies of 
the past. 
 
Past Growth and Future Sustainability 
Three factors stand out in explaining Pakistan’s high growth rates in the period up 
to the early 1980s:  (1) a sharp increase in investment levels especially in the 1960s. (2) 
the low initial level of industrial development which made relatively quick productivity 
gains from structural change possible and (3) robust agricultural growth after 1960 
assisted both by large investments and major technological breakthroughs. 
Fixed investment in Pakistan rose dramatically from less than 4 percent of GDP 
in 1949-50 to 11.5 percent in 1959-60 and further to nearly 21 percent in 1964-65. Even 
though the investment rate declined to 14.3 percent of GDP by 1969-70, it had recovered 
to 18 percent rate by 1976-77. Notwithstanding the drop in the latter part of the sixties, 
real investment for the decade as a whole was nearly three times its volume in the 1950s. 
The remarkable rates of growth of fixed investment of 15 percent per annum in the 
1950s and over 20 percent per annum in the first half of the 1960s were key factors  





underpinning growth in the 1960s.The effect of the decline in the investment rate  in the 
second half of the 1960s was more than offset by the remarkable gains in agricultural 
productivity under the green revolution. 
Large long-term investments in water and power initiated in the 1960s and 
continued in the early 1970s sustained growth well into the 1980s. Investment in the 
multipurpose Tarbela Dam, full benefits from which accrued in the late 1970s and early 
1980s partly because of technical difficulties which caused delays, had high economic 
returns. The rise in international oil prices after 1973 sharply increased the cost of 
thermal power, the alternative to hydroelectric power and therefore considerably 
enhanced the gains attributable to power generation from Tarbela.  Public policies of the 
Ayub era which mobilised large volumes of external assistance and directed a large part 
of it toward public investments in infrastructure deserve a great deal of credit for 
Pakistan’s continuing high growth into the early 1980s.  Industrial growth was rapid in 
the 1950s and 1960s because there was a lot of catching up to do.  Following the early 
disruption of the economic and trading relationship with India after independence, the 
availability of both large markets for mass consumption goods in East and West Pakistan 
as well as of agricultural raw materials needed, combined with strongly supportive 
government policies to sustain industrial growth in West Pakistan.  While there was not 
a great deal of experience with manufactured goods production, the technology of the 
early industries was relatively simple.  Government policies which ensured a very high 
rate of profit in manufacturing after 1952 provided vital support for the industrialisation 
process but were by no means the only cause of the high rate of industrial growth. 
Sustained annual agricultural growth of about 4 percent since 1960 has been the 
third critical element in Pakistan’s past growth.  While the agricultural sector has not 
been able to ensure self sufficiency in food grains or keep the large deficit in edible oils 
from growing steadily, it has yielded modest increases in per capita food grains 
production and large increases in raw cotton output which has sustained domestic cotton 
based industries and exports. The agricultural growth could have been  even higher if the 
government policies had not discriminated against agriculture for most of Pakistan’s 
history. 
The expansion of agricultural output has been linked closely to large expansion in 
irrigation water supply resulting from massive public investments in water resource 
development and to a lesser extent from increase in private tubewell development. 
The two technological breakthroughs in agriculture from high yielding varieties of 
wheat and rice in the late 1960s remarkable improvement in yields and  productivity 
in raw cotton during 1984–91 have also contributed strongly to agricultural growth. 
The combination of public policies and private entrepreneurship appear to have 
maintained the momentum in agriculture notwithstanding setbacks in raw cotton 
production after 1991. 
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It would thus appear that till the early 1980s, the record of Pakistan’s growth can 
be explained rather well in terms of traditional factors in growth, rapid increases in 
capital stock, availability of large domestic markets and fortuitous availability of new 
technologies in agriculture. The continuation of growth throughout most of the 1980s, 
notwithstanding a stagnation in the fixed investment rate at around 16-17 percent of 
GDP, may appear more puzzling. During this period a tremendous boost to economic 
activity was provided by the sharply rising worker remittances which at their peak in 
1982-83 totalled nearly $3 billion, or about 10 percent of GNP. Domestic spending 
related to inflow of worker remittances, external assistance for Afghani mujhahedin, and 
the narcotics trade especially pushed up the growth rate of the service sectors of the 
economy and tended to sustain overall economic activity till the late 1980s. These 
influences and the doubling of raw cotton production over 1980–1990 helped to offset 
the dampening effect of the stagnation of the fixed investment rate at around 17 percent 
during 1977–88.  But to an extent, growth was achieved at the cost of neglecting longer 
term investments in both human capital and infrastructure.  Serious shortages of 
infrastructure especially in the energy, transport and urban development sectors had 
developed already by the mid-1980s. While the congestion on roads and power 
shortages leading to large scale load shedding may not have adversely affected growth 
immediately, they did have an impact on the quality of life.  Insufficient attention given 
to longer term requirements of water, energy and transport sector also meant that 
towards the end of 1980s, there were few large projects in the pipeline which would 
have normally helped the momentum of growth in the 1990s. 
In any case, the GDP growth rate has clearly been on the decline since the mid-
1980s; the average annual growth rate of 4.9 percent during 1988–1996 compared 
unfavourably with the peak rate of 6.7 percent during 1977–83. The decline in 
remittances and the rise in net investment income payments (including interest on 
external debt) has meant that the GNP growth rate which adjusts for net factor income 
from abroad has fallen more sharply.  Indeed the per capita GNP during 1988–96 grew 
only 1.2 percent per annum, in sharp contrast to the record annual growth of 4.4 percent 
in 1977–1983. 
Prolonged stagnation in the investment rate, serious weaknesses in export and 
industrial structure and continued neglect of human resource and infrastructure 
development have been the principal factors behind the slow down of the growth in the 
1990s.  Major policy efforts at structural reform have been made during recent years: 
relaxation of investment controls on both domestic and foreign investors, liberalisation 
of foreign exchange and trade regime, alignment of prices of agricultural output and 
inputs more closely to international levels, reduction in credit and energy subsidies and 
initiation of privatisation of public sector assets in industry, banking and 
telecommunications and energy.  But these did not yield the desired results because 





were in the early stages of implementation.  For instance, only limited progress was 
made in privatising financial, telecommunications and the energy sector. The delay in 
the privatisation of large state owned banks was particularly costly because credit 
allocation decisions became more susceptible to political pressures under the 
democratically elected governments.  Movement toward dismantling high tariffs was 
slow, the anti-export bias of the policies remained unchanged and the slow pace of 
adjustment of the nominal exchange rate hurt export development.  More basically, 
structural reform measures were under-cut by the absence of strong efforts to reduce 
macro-economic imbalances, deteriorating effectiveness of resource use in the public 
sector and the growing abuses in the largely public sector controlled financial system. 
The worsening of the macro-economic situation was highlighted by the growing foreign 
exchange crisis after mid-1996 and reflected both low private savings and the 
persistence of large fiscal deficits. 
The forces which were behind the slow down of economic activity in the recent 
past are likely to persist unless major policy initiatives can reduce the macro-economic 
imbalances and bring about significant shifts in the pattern of development. That radical 
departures from the past patterns of development and development policy are necessary 
can be summed up in six points which confirm that the future cannot be like the past. 
First, Pakistan cannot hope to recover a 6 percent GDP growth rate with the 
present fixed investment rate of around 17 percent of GDP because the past neglect of 
major infrastructure investments in energy, transport and water sectors needs to be 
rectified.  If Pakistan wants to move towards a 7 percent growth rate, highly desirable for 
generation of adequate employment and sustained poverty alleviation, the investment 
rate would have to be raised gradually to 25 percent of GDP over the next decade or so. 
Second, even the maintenance of a fixed investment rate of 17-18 percent of 
GDP, over the next three years would require a very large domestic savings effort 
because the present reliance on foreign savings is totally unsustainable. The current 
account balance of payments which reached a peak of 7 percent of GDP in 1995-1996 
needs to be brought down to 4 percent of GDP over the next two years because of the 
need to limit recourse to short term borrowing including foreign currency deposits and 
to avoid major external payment difficulties in the future.  This means that all of the 
increase in domestic investment must be financed from national savings.  To reverse 
the declining growth rate and to achieve financial stability, Pakistan needs to raise its 
marginal savings rate from 15 percent to 30–35 percent during the next few years.  It 
would then need to sustain the marginal domestic savings rate at that level if it wanted 
to achieve acceleration in growth to 7  percent level.  Given that Pakistan must reduce 
both the absolute and relative level of net foreign inflows in the next few years, 
investment growth would depend solely on domestic resource mobilisation.  If the 
domestic saving rate cannot be stepped up sharply, there cannot be much hope for 
reviving the growth rate even to the 6  percent level.  This is a fundamental difference Parvez Hasan  390 
from the past, when foreign resources often could be substituted for domestic effort. 
Third, an exceptional domestic saving effort would have to be matched by an 
exceptional export performance (and selective import substitution, notably in food grains 
and edible oil) to strengthen the balance of payments.  Pakistan needs a big push in 
manufactured goods exports but will have to achieve it while reducing dependence on 
cotton textile exports generally and cotton yarn exports particularly because the 
profitability of a segment of the textile industry is uncertain. Improvements in the 
structure of manufactured goods exports could prove to be even more important for the 
long run than increases in volume. 
Fourth, in agriculture as in industry, there is need for both greater diversification 
and higher productivity.  The past pattern of development in agriculture in which large 
additions to the irrigation water supply could be taken for granted and the major crops, 
wheat and cotton remained dominant is not replicable.  Future growth in irrigation water 
availability will not be more limited and the technological breakthroughs in varieties of 
wheat, rice and cotton are not likely to be repeated. 
Fifth, the necessary emphasis on productivity and efficiency improvements both 
in agriculture and industry means that human resource development can no longer be 
neglected.  Without adequate skill formation and investment in human capital, the drive 
to increase exports will also not be successful. 
Finally, the distribution of growth benefits needs to be more equitable than in the 
past in order to improve general welfare and reverse the trend toward increasing the 




The policy shifts which are needed to restore growth and a more viable pattern of 
development in the future are indeed obvious. Here we must return to the question of the 
past policy performance, nature and causes of policy failures,  and the dynamics of 
decision making in the various political periods.  A central conclusion that emerges from 
the foregoing discussion is that in many critical areas, notably, domestic savings, 
exports, and social development, policy performance did not improve over time, lessons 
were not learned from experience and the institutional capacity for policy making and 
implementation progressively weakened. In retrospect, the biggest development policy 
failure was in the area of domestic savings. That the saving performance was 
deteriorating is clear from the fact that the domestic savings rate in 1996 was no higher 
than two decades earlier and that the proportion of investment that was financed from 
external flows was larger in 1996 than in 1970.  In exports, the apparently satisfactory 
expansion of the 1980s was greatly supported by subsidies on the domestic sales of raw 
cotton and masked serious problems in the structure and the competitiveness of exports.  





discriminate against exports, export volume growth had slowed to 1 percent per annum 
during 1994–1996. In education, another problem area, there was less progress in the 
1980s than either the 1950s or 1960s.  Finally in the area of governance, public 
institutions have been greatly weakened over time and the general effectiveness of 
public spending has declined especially in the period after 1988. 
Several factors help to explain why economic and social policy performance has 
deteriorated over time.  In the final analysis, responsibility for broad economic direction 
rests with the political leadership. In Pakistan’s case, especially in the period after Ayub 
Khan, successive political leadership lacked a clear economic vision, a sense of strategic 
direction and a strong commitment to economic development. Because annual growth 
remained high and there never was a serious financial or economic crisis, longer term 
structural adjustments could often be ignored. The relatively easy availability of external 
sources for funding investments also enabled Pakistan not to face hard choices between 
present and future consumption. The dynamics of policy making were also greatly 
influenced by the powerful top layers of bureaucracy. The remarkable continuity in 
economic leadership at the top civil service levels while imparting a measure of stability 
to policy making and ensuring a reasonably efficient day to day management also 
hindered any radical departures from past policies.  But as the general effectiveness of 
government institutions like the Planning Commission declined, the top economic 
managers found themselves to be working without adequate staff support. In the 1970s, 
as planning was de-emphasised and economic policy making became more ad hoc, there 
was an exodus of well trained and experienced government economists from Pakistan. 
Unfortunately the strong development of the economics profession in the government 
under Ayub was not matched by similar growth in the universities.  One reason was the 
pre-occupation of foreign advisors with strengthening of the planning bodies. By and 
large,
19 the academic institutions did not receive large-scale financial and institutional 
support to create a research-friendly environment.
20 More fundamentally, the failure of 
the academia to attract the best and the brightest among the economists (and other 
professions) early on was related to the value system in the society which favoured 
government positions for their power and prestige and did not attach the same 
importance to intellectual endeavours and analytical pursuits. As a result, the universities 
were not able to fill the gap caused by declining economics capacity in the government. 
In these circumstances, the role of international organisations like the World 
Bank and the IMF, in giving economic advice and setting up policy agendas, grew 
enormously. But foreign advice can be best utilised only if the indigenous institutions are 
strong. Furthermore, the external conditionalities were not strictly enforced and could 
19The exception was the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics  (PIDE), which was strongly 
supported by the Ford Foundation in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. 
20Nadeem ul Haque and Mahmood Hasan Khan, The Economics Profession in Pakistan: A 
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not have, in any case, served as a substitute for strong political will and decisive political 
leadership. The constraints on policy making were also growing because over time, the 
vested interests—notably the industrialists, large landowners and urban elites—became 
more powerful as their wealth grew and their ability to influence distorted but complex 
systems of taxes and subsidies became stronger. Finally, under the long period of 
military rule under Zia, the lack of participation in the political processes and limited 
freedom of the press kept national issues from being debated.  National public opinion 
could thus never be mobilised, and there was no real consensus on development 
priorities or direction of development. 
Our review of economic policies during various political regimes suggests that 
while there were major policy mistakes in the 1950s and 1960s, there were also solid 
policy accomplishments and strong institutional growth.  The foundations for much 
sustained growth in the subsequent two decades was laid during the sixties.  Economic 
policies during the 1970s weakened the basis of long term growth by crippling the 
private sector and weakening the public sector development institutions.  Policies of the 
1980s did little to restore the fundamentals for high long term growth and did not halt 
the institutional decline that set in after 1970.  Genuine policy reform efforts in the 1990s 
were stymied by the growing power of vested interests, further decline in effectiveness 
of government machinery and a general inability to enforce financial discipline. 
 
Governance Problems 
A discussion of economic policy performance cannot be complete without a 
reference to the problems of governance which have seriously hindered economic 
management especially in the period since the mid-1980s. Some of these problems, 
increasingly weak institutional capacity, reduced effectiveness of public spending, 
growing abuse of resources in the public sector financial institutions, have already been 
mentioned above. Worsening performance of public sector institutions in allocation and 
use of funds has been accompanied by increasing difficulty of resource mobilisation. 
That the tax collection machinery is not very effective and tax evasion has been 
increasing is clearly demonstrated by the stagnant ratio of tax revenues to GDP 
notwithstanding huge additional taxation undertaken in the 1990s. Apart from tax 
evasion, the diversion of public resources is also reflected in default on bank loans, 
unpaid utility bills, and theft of electricity and other services provided by public sector 
entities. The growing scale of this diversion of resources has been made possible only by 
a general rise in the level of corruption among public officials and a general deterioration 
in the quality of public servants not unrelated to a sharp decline in their real wages. 
 
 





The current governance problems have several causes. At a general level, 
increasing breakdown of law and order and the failure of the legal system to provide 
timely recourse have undermined the authority of the state. The rapid expansion of 
illegal activities such as narcotics trade, increasing size of the informal economy and 
relatively slow growth of the modern sector have adversely affected tax collections. The 
widespread perception among the public that the top leadership was not honest and 
dedicated has contributed to a decline of moral values. The present governance problems 
have also their roots in the pattern of economic development over the last fifty years. 
The uneven distribution of growth benefits and increasing dualism in the society are 
reflected in the sharp contrast between the growing numbers of poor and illiterate on the 
one hand and increasing sophistication and wealth of the elites and upper-middle classes 
on the other. The divergence
21 in the lifestyles between the rich and the poor is normal in 
the early stages of capitalist development. In Pakistan, however, this divergence appears 
to have become especially pronounced in recent years as economic growth slowed 
down, real wages tended to fall and the incidence of poverty probably increased. Equally 
important, the government policies which have neglected the social sectors and 
bestowed unearned benefits on industrialists and entrepreneurs have aggravated income 
disparities. It is not, therefore, altogether surprising that tensions within the society have 
grown over time and have begun to erupt with increasing frequency in ethnic, sectarian 
and random violence. 
While an improvement in the law and order situation is necessary for stimulating 
investment and growth, the pattern of future growth must seek to ensure that some of the 
underlying causes of tensions in the society, i.e., poverty, illiteracy, and growing income 
disparities, are removed or mitigated over time. As Pakistan looks to the future, the 
growth and governance agendas appear to be inter-twined. Without an improvement in 
the quality of governance and a reversal of the decline in public institutions it will be 
difficult to revive economic growth. But the challenge also is to revive economic growth 
in a manner and with a set of polices that will correct the imbalances of the past, seek to 
restore greater harmony in the society and help deal with the governance issues such as 
corruption and law and order. 
 
Learning from the Past 
The economic issues that Pakistan now faces are very real and can be traced to 
the failures of past policies and lack of institutional development.  Relatively, high 
growth has not ensured sustainability or a fair sharing of growth benefits. Though the 
21This divergence is reflected, among other things, in the educational opportunities for the various 
classes. As a general rule, the lower-income groups cannot afford the better-quality private schools for 
their children and have to be content with cheap but poor-quality public schools. In the rural areas, even 
access to public primary education cannot be taken for granted. On the other extreme, probably a large 
majority of the students from upper-middle and high-income families go abroad for college-level 
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income distribution statistics do not fully reflect this, wage, employment, poverty and 
access to the social services figures clearly suggest that higher income groups have 
enjoyed disproportionate benefits from the high overall growth. Equally seriously, they 
have not contributed adequately either to domestic savings or government revenues. As 
a result Pakistan has a low rate of investment in physical and human capital but has an 
extraordinary dependence on external resources for even this low level of investment. 
Clearly the future cannot be like the past. Because of stagnant investment levels, 
inadequate human resource development, structural weaknesses in industry and exports, 
limited prospects for additions to irrigation water availability in the near future, and the 
urgent need to reduce net foreign inflows to avoid a major debt crisis, high growth rates 
of GDP cannot be taken for granted. At the same time the growing divisions in the 
society make it imperative that policies give more attention to basic education, job 
creation and poverty reduction. A broad national consensus on economic strategy and 
development priorities is needed if the massive domestic resource mobilisation which is 
required is to be successfully undertaken. But this consensus will not be achieved, if the 
general public is not convinced that the benefits of future growth would be more 
equitably shared than in the past. 
In seeking to restore growth and ensure a more viable pattern of growth, future 
policies must also draw on the lessons of the past. These lessons relate not only to 
economic management but also to, domestic politics, foreign policy, population 
dynamics and governance issues. First, the Pakistan experience does not belie the 
conventional wisdom that political stability and strong governments are conducive to 
the process of economic growth in developing countries. While the growth has been 
more or less steady throughout, the periods of most rapid growth were also the periods 
of relative political stability. Second, the strained relations with India have had a 
profound negative effect on economic and social development because of the 
competition between defence and development which has dominated resource 
allocation decisions for much of Pakistan’s history, the exception being the period 
1954-65 when large scale US military and economic assistance greatly relieved the 
pressure on the fiscal position. Third, the failure to bring down the population growth 
rate has not only lowered the overall increase in per capita income but has also 
worsened the gap between the rich and the poor, limited the progress in social 
development and contributed to the difficulties of governance. In economic policy 
areas, the major lessons from the past are: the neglect of both domestic savings and 
exports has been very costly and has perpetuated both the heavy reliance on foreign 
savings and a low rate of investment, the lack of a clear, consistent and supportive 
framework for the private sector has hampered the development of modern industry 
while the structure of incentives and trade policies have favoured both import 
substitution and low value added activities, the eroding strength of public institutions  





spending and distorted private sector investment decisions. Some of the failures of 
economic policies such as the low rate of domestic savings and persistently high fiscal 
deficits were closely linked to the broader issues of foreign policy and defence 
spending. But others, like the perpetuation of anti-export policies, the failure to evolve 
an effective tax machinery, the declining effectiveness of public expenditures 
(development and non-development), and the neglect of human resource development, 
were very much in purview of domestic policy. 
Whether Pakistan can learn from its mistakes and set in motion the societal 
changes and policy adjustments to deliver a more balanced and equitable growth for its 
rapidly growing population during the next half-century remains a critical question. The 
massive majority with which the new Nawaz Sharif government was voted into power in 
February 1997 created at least the pre-condition for political stability which had been 
greatly lacking for quite some time. 
But the economic record in the first year of the new government is far from 
reassuring. The government provided tax relief before strengthening the tax 
administration and ensuring the broadening of the tax base.  The result has been a drop 
in the already low tax-GDP ratio.  The government also showed inadequate appreciation 
of the structural constraints on economic growth, pinned its hopes on a quick economic 
turn-around, and did not prepare the public for the need for greater domestic savings, 
more self-reliance, and a period of painful adjustment.  Finally, in creating a pro-
business and pro-growth environment, the government was not seen as matching the 
interests of the rich against the poor. The challenges of job creation, poverty alleviation, 
and human development will be helped by a recovery in economic growth, but as the 
past experience suggests, growth alone will not ensure a reasonable distribution of 






The paper is quite comprehensive and examines the growth of GDP, 
agriculture and manufacturing sector, fiscal and monetary policies, exports, imports, 
balance of payments, rate of inflation, etc. It is an interesting study and points out 
various distortions in the economic system but suggests very little as to how we can 
learn from the past mistakes. Why the economy performed so differently across 
different time-periods and what was its relationship with the respective policies have 
not been explored in the study. 
The study mentions that Pakistan has not been successful in eradicating 
poverty. This is a sweeping statement especially in view of the fact that there has 
been a continuous decline in poverty upto 1987-88. It is only during the last decade 
that poverty has started rising. Why poverty declined in the earlier period and rose 
during the last decade, and whether the trickle-down theory led to reduction in 
poverty or safety-nets in the private sector or some other policies were instrumental 
in the eradication of poverty need to be analysed. 
The study highlights the need for structural changes in the economy for 
sustainable growth. While there is hardly any disagreement about the need, the paper 
fails to specify clearly the structural problems and the ways in which it can be 
efficiently achieved. 
A number of measures which might have resulted in higher growth during the 
Zia period have been mentioned by the author. However, improvement in 
productivity, especially in the public sector manufacturing industries, has been 
completely ignored. 
Dr Hasan points out that social unrest against Ayub Khan was due to the fact 
that the investment rate had started falling. While private investment did fall, and 
could have resulted in a decline in output and employment, and in turn to unrest at a 
later stage, the unrest was essentially a reaction to the failure of growth to trickle-
down to the masses. The wage rate had remained consistently low, and up to the 
mid-60s it had even been falling. 
Dr Hasan makes the very interesting observation that fiscal deficit may have 
been higher by another 2 percentage points if the quasi deficit arising from the loss 
on forward cover to foreign currency accounts was accounted for. While the 
argument that it necessarily burdens the economy is correct, it must have not led to 
an increase in quasi deficit; the loss due to foreign currency accounts is already 
captured in the fall in the State Bank’s profits which become part of non-tax 
revenues to the government. Comments  397
No doubt, the defence expenditure in the Zia period had gone up. This is also 
a fact that development expenditure had also gone down over time. However, Dr 
Hasan overdraws the case because the decline in development expenditure has been 
far less than that has been suggested because a number of corporations which are 
financing their own expenditures were earlier part of the Public Sector Development 
Programme (PSDP). Dr Hasan himself takes note of this problem when he addresses 
the budget deficit and says that a reduction in the budget deficit has been overstated. 
It would have been interesting to see to what extent the fiscal deficit declined if such 
corrections were made. 
Slow growth of exports has been attributed to missed opportunities. But why 
these were missed and why the structure of export remains dependent on cotton-
based exports has not been examined. It is suggests that it has been due to policy 
failures, but which policies failed and how those should be rectified has not even 
been mentioned. 
A. R. Kemal 







It is indeed a great pleasure for me to be invited as a discussant on the paper 
by Dr Parvez Hasan who has had a distinguished career as a planner and 
development economist both within and outside Pakistan. He is among a small group 
of Pakistani economists who, after having gained prominence in policy-making roles 
in their own country in the first two decades of development, were called upon by 
international institutions to take up assignments in the formulation of development 
policies for other developing countries. It was a tribute as much to their personal 
attainments as to the prospects of Pakistan’s development in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. It has been my privilege to have known Dr Parvez Hasan since the early 
1960s, when he began his career at the State Bank in Karachi and later joined the 
Planning Commission. Later, in Pakistan, he served as the Chief Economist of West 
Pakistan. Although our career paths never crossed, we do have the affinity of having 
Yale as our common alma mater. 
Dr Hasan has given us an extremely well-woven, almost kaleidoscopic, account 
of the policy dilemmas, challenges, successes, and disappointments faced by Pakistan 
in the last fifty years. As someone who has directly or at least closely participated in 
decision-making at the policy level during many of those years—especially the period 
which was among the most promising in Pakistan’s development—his account is both 
authentic and poignant. It reminds us of the past glories and achievements of Pakistan’s 
development and underlines the regrets about things that could have been if Pakistan 
had persevered in pursuing the policies that held it in good stead in the difficult period 
of its initial struggle for existence and in showing the determination to carve out a 
place for the new nation against tremendous odds. Having acquired an international 
perspective after working at the World Bank for over two decades, much of which 
were spent in handling the problems of East Asia, Dr Hasan seemingly feels that 
Pakistan’s economic fundamentals were much better than those of the latter, and had 
Pakistan followed some of the policies especially in regard to savings mobilisation and 
export growth that were pursued by them, it would certainly have achieved no less 
spectacular results. While this may be cavilled about by many on the grounds that East 
Asia’s initial conditions in terms of literacy rates, land reforms, and other institutional 
factors were far better than Pakistan’s, the role of policy environment remains 
important. 
Nevertheless, Dr Parvez Hasan’s detailed analysis of Pakistan’s development 
over the last five decades and his comparison with other developing countries brings 
out the important fact that Pakistan’s potential for growth is much higher than it has 
been possible for it to achieve in the last five decades, especially during the last 
decade or so. Even more, the paper regrets the flawed pattern of Pakistan’s growth, Comments  399
which has now reached a proportion which makes growth unsustainable without 
recourse to the correction of major structural imbalances. Dr Parvez Hasan perceives 
the persistence of a “growth crisis” which in the past was somehow easily ignored, 
notwithstanding the lack of political stability and the poor record on social and 
human development. 
Dr Hasan’s catalogue of successes and failures of Pakistan’s economic 
development may not be shared by everyone in its detail, nor perhaps would there be 
consensus on their underlying reasons, yet his assessment of Pakistan’s past record 
and future prospects is undeniably cogent and well-argued. Shortage of time prevents 
me from doing full justice to his detailed analysis and, therefore, I will necessarily 
have to be selective in my comments. 
Although Dr Parvez Hasan seems to subscribe to the widely-held and rather 
dangerous notion that in the case of Pakistan, democracy and development are 
negatively correlated, he is careful to qualify that it is empirically difficult to 
attribute the growth in one period to the decisions taken solely in that period and to 
ignore the cumulative effects of decisions taken in earlier periods, and therefore 
implies that such an association could be spurious. What he, however, fails to stress 
equally is that the legacy of negative effects of high growth achieved during periods 
of martial law (or variations thereof) always left a burden of institutional decay and 
disruption that held back the progress in development in the succeeding periods of 
democratic rule. With the sword of Democles of military intervention (or its 
surrogate) hanging over the politicians’ heads, there was little time for institutional 
development and almost total preoccupation of the incumbent governments with 
survival in the perilous game of musical chairs, which has been played with 
disgusting regularity during the last decade. 
If Pakistan’s political development had taken place more smoothly and 
democratic institutions of governance had been allowed to take firmer root, perhaps 
the sacrifice of a few percentage points in growth over the two “golden decades” 
would have been worthwhile in the long-term perspective. In contrast, India’s slower 
growth until the early 1990s, which has been termed as the “Hindu” growth rate, can 
at least partly be attributed to India’s greater, though by no means spectacular, 
success in institutional, social, and human development. No wonder, therefore, that 
in the development race the cumbersome Indian tortoise has in recent years surprised 
the erstwhile sprightly Pakistani hare. Even Bangladesh, whose chances of survival 
as an independent country were discounted by its many detractors among us at the 
time of its independence, as much as were Pakistan’s prospects 25 years earlier, has 
begun to look like a more credible prospect as a South Asian tiger than us. 
 
THE COST OF HIGH GROWTH 
Pakistan’s abiding rapture with growthmanship has cost it dearly in terms 
of other desirable attributes of development. Income distribution, poverty S. M. Naseem  400
alleviation, human resource development, domestic savings mobilisation, 
external debt redemption, and diversification of the industrial and export base 
have all suffered in the unrestrained pursuit of growth objective, which itself is 
now in jeopardy. By putting these other issues on the back burner and hoping 
that the trickle-down effect or some other fortuitous circumstance will take care 
of these issues, the planners grossly underestimated the problems that they were 
going to face. 
At the end of the 1960s, some degree of self-doubt and disillusionment began 
to be articulated even by the country’s leading growth protagonist, who voiced 
apprehensions about the emergence of “twenty-two” families. In February 1972, at 
the last meeting of the now defunct Pakistan Economic Association, a number of 
papers on income distribution and unemployment were presented, including, notably, 
one by the late Jawed Azfar. At about the same time, I, as a little known academic 
from one of Pakistan’s universities (which Dr Parvez Hasan rightly points out were 
badly neglected), published a paper on poverty in Pakistan, which Dr Hasan’s paper 
graciously takes note of, although it has been superseded by much more recent and 
technically superior research. Unfortunately, the political regime that succeeded 
Ayub Khan was strong in populist rhetoric and obsessed with power but very weak 
in economic and social planning. It hardly had the time to heed or had use for any 
kind of research or advice. The infrastructure of macroeconomic management 
weakened through political interference and the regime’s increasing political 
alienation from the West—which also caused a large-scale exodus of economic and 
other technical experts, including Dr Parvez Hasan himself. Thus a major 
opportunity to change the course of our short economic history and steer the 
economy on a more balanced pattern of development was missed. 
While Bhutto’s regime made a number of inexcusable mistakes, including that 
of following across-the-board nationalisation of industries and financial institutions, 
it must be credited with, as Dr Hasan’s paper rightly does, with initiating a number 
of infrastructure and heavy industry projects, which were neglected in the past and 
which had a positive impact on growth in the 1980s. The period 1977–85 is 
acclaimed as a second period of high and stable growth in Pakistan. However, 
ironically, this was also a period in which the cause of long-term development 
suffered the most. As a result of the military regime’s need for legitimising its 
existence, decision-making became increasingly ad hoc and devoid of long-term 
perspective, a point Dr Parvez Hasan’s paper does not fail to acknowledge. In 
addition, democratic institutions were frozen or disrupted, debate and dissent were 
stifled, and extremist religious tendencies were encouraged. The prolonged and deep 
involvement in the Afghan conflict and the infusion of drugs and Kalashnikovs into 
our economy and political culture had debilitating effects on our longer-term 
development, institutions, and values, which continue to be felt even more than a 
decade after that period. Growth and investment during the Zia period was Comments  401
stimulated by a large inflow of remittances and foreign aid inflows with little impact 
on the domestic production structure. 
During the last decade or so, and until last February, Pakistan has seen a 
period of high political instability. In the last ten years, we have had almost as many 
Prime Ministerial changes and half as many caretaker government and four elections. 
To what extent this political instability has contributed to the slowing down of our 
growth rate in the same period is difficult to say, although it is unlikely to have been 
marginal. The elected governments that have since been in and out of office have 
faced an incredibly difficult task as each successive government has tried to outdo its 
predecessor in making promises that can hardly be fulfilled and then deciding to 
decamp with the loot when the end was in sight. On a more serious level, each has 
inherited an increasing set of unsolved problems, especially the core problem of 
rising fiscal deficits and the associated problem of servicing the external debt burden. 
The governments have been caught in a vicious circle in which the lack of resources 
leads to its diminishing credibility as an agent of economic and social change, which 
in turn makes it more ineffective in mobilising the needed resources for 
development. Elected governments do have political constituencies and need to 
spend money to honour their electoral pledges. Unfortunately, in Pakistan this has 
not been done in a transparent or judicious way. Although the populist agenda which 
was introduced in the early 1970s has gained wide political endorsement and even 
donor support, the funds spend on the social sector, poverty alleviation, and human 
resource development programmes have largely leaked through to unscrupulous 
political power-brokers and the country has seen little improvement in its leading 
social indicators. The increased involvement of the NGOs and social activism have, 
to some extent, improved the access of the poor to basic social facilities. However, 
the danger of emergence of a new non-governmental bureaucracy, which would in 
time become as far removed from the problems of the poor as the more traditional 
one, can not be ruled out. These and other problems under the now popular rubric of 
governance are, however, not adequately discussed in Dr Hasan’s paper. 
The last decade of Pakistan’s existence has also been a period in which as 
many as four structural adjustment programmes have been negotiated and none of 
them has run its full term so far because of the government’s inability to meet the 
conditionalities. Dr Hasan’s paper does not go into the problems of structural 
adjustment faced by Pakistan during the last decade, and the reasons why such 
efforts have failed. He does, however, make the very significant point that the role of 
international organisations like the World Bank and the IMF to give advice and set 
up policy agendas has grown disproportionately to the growth in the indigenous 
capacity to critically receive such advice. Indeed, the world over, as most recently 
illustrated in the tough negotiations of the IMF with Korea, the capacity to negotiate 
with these agencies is becoming a critical factor in ensuring the prospects of growth 
under structural adjustment programmes. This requires not only an able Finance S. M. Naseem  402
Minister and one or two competent deputies, which we do fortunately have at the 
moment, but also an entire infrastructure of teaching and research in the complex 
problems of a globalised economy. Pakistan’s continued neglect in developing such 
a capacity at all levels has eroded what exists to an intolerably low point. It calls for 
an all-out effort to remedy the situation. By raising this important issue in his paper 
at this forum, Dr Hasan has done a great service to the economics profession, and I 
hope, Mr Chairman, you, whom the profession regards as one of its own, will 
urgently take measures to remedy the situation, especially with the strong possibility 
of your assuming the highest office in the land. 
S. M. Naseem 
House No. 14/A, 
Street No. 2, 
F-8/3, 
Islamabad. 